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ABSTRACT
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) proposed by the 
Object M anagement Group (OMG) is a widely accepted standard to provide a system 
level framework in design and implementation of distributed objects. The core o f the 
Object M anagement Architecture (OMA) is an Object Request Broker (ORB), which 
provides transparency of object location, activation, and communications. However, the 
specification provided by the OMG is not sufficient. For instance, there is no security 
specifications when handling object requests through the ORBs. The lack of such a 
security service prevents the use of CORBA from handling sensitive data such as personal 
and corporate financial information.
In view of the above, this thesis identifies, explores, and provides an approach to 
handling secure objects in a distributed environment along with a persistent object service 
using the CORBA specification. The research specifically involves the design and 
implementation of a secured distributed object service. This object service requires a 
persistent service and object storage for storing and retrieving security specific 
information. To provide a secure distributed object environment, a secure object service 
using the specifications provided by the OMG has been designed and implemented. In 
addition, to preserve the persistence o f secure information, an object service has been 
implemented to provide a persistent data store.
The secure object service can provide a framework for handling distributed 
object in applications requiring security clearance such as distributed banking, online 
stock tradings, internet shopping, geographic and medical information systems.
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C h a pt e r  1
In t r o d u c t io n
A distributed database is a collection of data that belongs logically to the same 
system but is physically spread over the sites of a computer network [17]. Design of 
distributed databases by this definition can increase the performance o f database 
applications in two aspects: by reducing the amount of irrelevant data accessed by the 
applications and by reducing the amount o f data transferred in processing the 
applications [22]. The object-oriented concept for representing real-world entities, on the 
other hand, can be added onto the distributed database management system to provide 
encapsulation, type and class hierarchies, inheritance, and operator polymorphism.
An object is one o f the main forms of abstraction used in object-oriented 
programming methodologies. An object includes a “state” and “behavior”. An instance 
o f data is called a state. Operations that can be performed on the data are called behavior. 
An object includes both the state and the behavior. A class or type, is a specification of 
the object’s state and behavior [3]. Classes form a hiearchy. A class below another class 
in the hiearchy inherits all the properties of the above class. This mechanism is called 
inheritance. These set of operations form the interface to that object. Ideally, the state or 
data held in an object should be accessed or modified using only the object’s interface.
This property is called encapsulation.
Since 1987, a number of object-oriented database systems have emerged in the 
market. However, most of them have been in evaluation and preliminary prototype 
application development. None o f them have been seriously used for mission-critical 
applications [23]. The current state of object technology is itself contributing to the 
problem  via the diversity of object models. This is one of the aims of the Object 
M anagement Group (OMG) [40] to develop command models, a common interface for 
the development, and use of large-scale distributed applications using object-oriented 
technology [53]. The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) developed 
by OMG is designed to allow integration of a wide variety o f object systems. It defines 
the high-level framework in order to develop an object-oriented database system in a 
heterogeneous distributed environment.
Currently, database systems are designed to accommodate many users and very 
large sets of data; hence performance, security and authorization, transaction 
management, concurrency control, recovery, persistent storage, and dynamic schema 
changes become important issues. These issues have been stressed in the CORBA model. 
In particular, we focus more on the areas of persistence, and security and authorization. 
CORBA can be extended to incorporate a number o f common object services which 
support basic functions for using and implementing objects. Each of the issues 
mentioned above can be solved by adding more object services. The Common Object 
Services specification released by OMG in March 1995 includes the persistent object 
service specification, but few CORBA based systems have incorporated the persistent 
storage of objects. However, the latest CORBA specification (2.0) still has not covered
how to handle the security and authorization. Research is continuing in an effort to 
incorporate security to the CORBA specification.
1.1 T h e s is  O b je c t iv e s
The objective of this thesis is to design and implement a secure distributed object- 
oriented database management system along with a persistent object service using the 
CORBA specification. The object service should provide a mechanism to protect 
sensitive object data from being released to unauthorized personnel. A persistent object 
service is required to provide methods to preserve security information in a object- 
oriented data store.
In brief, we have five major objectives:
1. Evaluation o f existing CORBA based implementations.
2. Evaluation of existing Object-Oriented Database Systems.
3. Evaluation o f various security models and requirements.
4. Addition of persistence to a CORBA based implementation.
5. Design and implementation a security model to a CORBA based implementation.
For the first three objectives, we will examine some of the CORBA based 
implementation and Object-Oriented Database Storage systems on the market that were 
developed by industry and educational institutions. Then, we will implement the 
persistence object service based on the persistence object service specification released 
by OMG. Finally, we will design and implement our security model on a CORBA based 
implementation.
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1.2 O v e r v ie w  o f  t h e  A p p r o a c h
As mentioned above, this research requires design and implementation of a 
secure object service. This thesis will provide a security model suitable to handle 
distributed objects. The model is based on a role-based environment. Each role is 
associated with a set of system privileges. A role contains authorization information to 
allow or to deny access to users. The model preserves the inheritance property of objects 
such that a role can inherit properties from other roles. An approach to operate and to 
maintain a role graph will be designed and implemented as an object service using 
CORBA specifications.
It is necessary to preserve the security information for the role-base model. In 
doing so, a persistent object service is required to store and retrieve role graph 
information in and out from an object storage. The persistent service hides the 
communication interfaces necessary to connect to an object-oriented data store.
The overall design consists of three main software components. They are: a role- 
based authorization interface, a persistent object service to an object store, and an event 
handler. The role-based authorization interface provides functions to perform security 
check on users and to maintain the role graph security information. The persistent object 
service allows permanent and secure storage for the security information. The event 
handler provides mechanism to allow the role-based authorization interface to perform 
security checks for object requests through the Object Request Brokers (ORBs). The 
ORB is the core o f the object management system to identify, locate and handle object 
requests.
This thesis includes a detailed description of the design and implementation of
secure object service. It also includes an implementation of persistent object service in 
use with an object-oriented database system.
1.3 T a r g e t  A p p l ic a t io n  E n v ir o n m e n t
Secure distributed object management has become a hot issue with the increasing 
demands on internet services and distributed applications. Financial institutions such as 
banks and stock brokers start to provide on-line services to customers. The information 
requested can be complicated objects such as monthly financial reports with spreadsheets 
and graphical charts. The role-based model can provide security control for user 
authentication. This model is flexible and can be used to handle multimedia objects.
Another application is in handling distributed data o f a corporation. Large 
corporations are trying to handle complex objects distributed among their various 
locations. The complex objects can incorporate financial data, employee information and 
business plans. The data are classified and security clearance is necessary for information 
request. The data can also be distributed into different database systems at remote 
locations. CORBA with the role-based security service introduced in this thesis can 
provide a standard framework with authentication control to implement distributed 
applications on these data.
1.4  S c o p e
Distributed object management covers a broad area in computer science. It covers 
computer network issues, distributed computing issues, object management issues and so 
on. This thesis addresses issues of providing a secure distributed object-oriented database
management system to handle sensitive data transfer using CORBA specification. The 
implementation will use ORBeline by Post Modern Computing as the CORBA 
implementation. ORBeline is a commercial CORBA implementation. It provides a 
general framework for developing CORBA compliant applications on distributed objects.
This work does not address all current issues related to distributed object-oriented 
database management. Rather, it addresses the critical problems existing in the widely 
accepted standard CORBA. The prototype introduced in this thesis is not sufficient to 
cover all the limitations o f CORBA. Data encryption on transferring objects is another 
research topic. Other critical issues related to distributed object-oriented database 
management system include locking mechanisms, optimization methodologies and 
interoperability issues in ORBs.
1.5  O r g a n iz a t io n  o f  t h e  T h e sis
The remaining chapters of this thesis are organized as follows: Chapter 2 is the 
research context and related works. This will include discussion on some CORBA based 
distributed objects management systems and some object-oriented database systems 
currently available on the market. The model of persistent storage will also be discussed 
in this chapter. In addition, we will evaluate several security models which could be used 
on our object-oriented database system. Chapter 3 will focus in detail on the design and 
implementation o f a persistent object service in use with an object-oriented database 
system. Three protocols will be discussed for handling persistent objects. The three are 
the Direct Access Protocol, the Dynamic Data Object Protocol and the OD M G ’93 
Protocol [12]. The implementation of the persistent service is provided with description
of the CORBA Interface Definition Language (IDL). Implementation to persistent 
service for storing and retrieving objects in and out from an object-oriented database 
system will also be explained. Chapter 4 is the design and implementation o f the role- 
based security model. Our abstract design model will be given in this chapter. Also, 
codes and explanation will be provided to implement the security service and to integrate 
it to CORBA. Chapter 5 will conclude our research work in this area and suggest some 
future extensions to our model.
C h a p t e r  2
R e se a r c h  C o n t e x t
Object-oriented technology emerged in late 1960s with the introduction of the 
SIM ULA language. The object paradigm has been used in various areas since then. The 
most powerful capabilities from the object-oriented technology are class inheritance and 
encapsulation of knowledge. Today’s database systems have been used not only in 
medium-size database systems, but also in very large database systems. Data handled by 
database systems no longer reside on single machines. They may be distributed over 
high-speed networks. Types of data stored in a database range from simple text data to 
multimedia data involving image, audio and video. The idea of data hiding resulted from 
the object relation can hide the complexity of today’s database systems to the database 
developers, end-users, database administrators. Overloading, overriding, and late binding 
capabilities from object-oriented concepts can reduce significant amounts o f time in 
application development [45]. However, the advancement from this technology on the 
area o f distributed database development has been slowed down by the fact that no 
standardized framework exists for the developers. The Object M anagement Group 
(OMG) [40] was formed in 1989 with the purpose of creating standards allowing for the 
interoperability and portability of distributed object-oriented applications. A large group
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of companies including the major players in the commercial distributed object-oriented 
computing arena have joined OMG for creation of a standard specification for a 
framework in distributed object-oriented database environments. The Common Object 
Request Broker Architecture released by OMG is a concrete description of the interfaces 
and services provided by the compliant core elements in the architecture [58]. But still, 
there are other issues that have not yet been handled by the CORBA specification such as 
security, one of the key elements in distributed object-oriented database system. The 
enforced security policies are directly affected by the based architecture.
This chapter will first briefly describe CORBA, then will evaluate some of the 
existing CORBA based systems on the market. Next, we will move our attention to some 
existing object-oriented database systems. Finally, several security models will be 
discussed.
2 .1  D is t r ib u t e d  O b j e c t  T e c h n o l o g ie s
This section will discuss the current technologies available to handle distributed 
object. To begin with, the Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) by 
the Object Management Group (OMG) [40] will be presented. A number o f CORBA 
based systems have become available on the market since the release of CORBA 
specification version 1.1 by OMG. There are also some CORBA like systems such as 
Xeros PARC’s ILU [20] and Stratus/ISIS Reliable Distributed Objects (RDO). CORBA 
based systems are IBM ’s DSOM [54], Iona’s Orbix [37], DEC’s Object Broker [36], 
Expersoft’s PowerBroker, ILOG’s ILOG Broker, H P 's ORBplus, PostModern 
Com puting’s ORBeline [38], Prism Technologies’ OpenBase, and Sun M icrosystems’
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N EO™ [55]. O f these CORBA based systems, three will be discussed; namely, IBM ’s 
SOM [54], Sun M icrosystems’ NEO [55] and PostModern Computing’s ORBeline [38]. 
Their basic features, functionalities, and their compliance to CORBA specification will 
be evaluated.
2 .1 .1  C O R B A
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) is designed to allow 
integration o f a wide variety of object systems. It comprises o f various key interfaces, 
services, and the core element, the Object Request Broker (ORB). The ORB is like a 
postal system and is basically responsible for routing client requests to objects. The 
objects can reside on a local computer system or a remote one. The client is unaware of 
the location o f the recipient object and the recipient object does not know the location of 
the client. All of the communication between client and object is performed by the ORB 
and such activity happens transparently as if all the participants were on a single 
computer system.
2 .1 .1 .1  S t r u c t u r e  o f  a n  O b je c t  R e q u e s t  B r o k e r
Figure 1 shows a request being sent by a client to an object implementation. The 
client wishes to perform an operation on the object and the object implementation is the 
code and data that actually implements the object. The ORB is responsible for all of the 
mechanisms required to find the object implementation for the request, to prepare the 
object implementation to receive the request, and to communicate the data making up the
request. The client will not know where the object is located or what programming 
language implements the object implementation [40].
Client Object Implementation
Request
Figure 1: Client sending a request through the Object Request Broker
Figure 2 shows the structure o f the Object Request Broker (ORB). In order to 
make a request, the client can use the Dynamic Invocation interface which is the same 
interface independent of the target object’s interface. Or, the client can use the IDL stubs 
which are specific to the interface of the object. It is also possible for the client to call 
other ORB interfaces.
There are two ways for the object implementation to receive the request from the 
client, either through the IDL generated skeleton or through a dynamic skeleton. The 
object implementation can call the object adapter during the process o f the request.
12
Object ImplementationClient
ynamicStatic IDL 
Skeleton Object
Adapter
Ske etonIDL
Stubs
ORB 
Interface
Dynamic
Invocation
ORB Core
k \ \ \ \ \ S  Interface identical for all ORB im plem entations 
X / / / / / A  There may be multiple object adap ters
There are s tu b s  and a skeleton for each object type 
ORB-dependent interface
ti
Up-call interface
Normal call 
interface
Figure 2: The Structure of Object Request Broker Interfaces [40]
The primary way to invoke services provided by the ORB is through the Object 
Adapter. It can provide services such as generation and interpretation o f object 
references, object implementation activation and deactivation, mapping objects 
references to implementations, and registration o f object implementations.
Interfaces can be defined in an Interface Definition Language (IDL). The 
language defines the types and structure of objects and the operation and the parameters 
to those operations. During a runtime, interfaces can be added to or referred from an 
Interface Repository Service. The Interface Repository Service provides persistent 
objects that represent the interface defined in the IDL available at a runtime.
13
This is just an overview of the functionalities of ORB. For more detail 
description, please refer to the CORBA specification 2.0 released by OMG in July 1995 
[40],
CORBA provides a general framework for a distributed object-oriented system. 
Any Object Request Broker (ORB) with CORBA compliance can be interoperable under 
this framework. For example, the ORB of IBM ’s DSOM can communicate with the ORB 
of NEO from Sun Microsystems to locate and perform distributed object requests. In the 
following section, a few CORBA based systems will be discussed.
2.1.2 IBM’S DSOM
IBM ’s SOM (System Object Model) [54] is fully based on CORBA standards and 
supports operating systems such as OS/2, AIX/6000 and MS Windows. It also provides 
OMG Common Object Services such as Persistent service that allows objects to be 
stored or restored to and from a repository that can be a file system, database or object 
database. The Persistent service will be discussed in the next chapter. SOM also provides 
frameworks such as replication and emitter frameworks. The Replication framework 
enables an object to be replicated in the address spaces of several processes distributed 
about a network. Each replicated object can be updated; the framework will guarantee 
that the updates are serialized. The Emitter framework aims to reduce the complication 
in software development. SOM ’s Interface Definition Language (SOM IDL) compiles 
with CORBA’s standard for IDL; it also adds constructs specific to SOM. There are two 
IDL compilers that include SOM, SOM IDL and OIDL which is the OMG CORBA IDL 
compiler. Programming languages supported by SOM are C and C++. In order to address
14
the cross-platform interoperability problem, SOM relies on its distributed object 
framework, sometimes called DSOM (Distributed SOM). DSOM is a set of SOM  classes 
that transparently extends the method dispatch mechanisms embodied in the SOM 
runtime engine to allow methods to be invoked, in a programmer transparent way, on 
objects in a different address space or on a different machine from the caller. DSOM is 
fully CORBA compatible, supporting all CORBA data types, functionality and 
programming interfaces. Currently, fully interoperable versions of the DSOM framework 
are available for SOM on AIX, OS/2 and Windows [54].
2.1.3 S u n  M ic r o sy st e m s ’ NEO™
N EO ™  formerly called Distributed Objects Everywhere (DOE) is a more 
powerful system than DSOM. It not only provides a full CORBA Specification 2.0 
facility but also numerous Common Object Services to support the CORBA framework 
such as Naming, Persistent Storage Manager, Associations, Properties, Events, and Life 
Cycle Services [55]. Life Cycle Services, for instance, define services and conventions 
for creating, deleting, copying and moving objects. In distributed environment, life cycle 
services create a set o f services and conventions for clients to perform life cycle 
operations on objects in different locations. Similar to DSOM, N E O ™  provides 
language bindings for C/C++ [41]. NEO’s Object Request Brokers (ORBs) can also 
interoperate with other CORBA compatible ORBs such as Iona’ Orbix for MS Windows 
on PC based platforms. With the recent development o f Java™ , an object-oriented 
programming language developed by SunSoft, it can provide Internet access to NEO 
environment through Java scripts.
2 .1 .4  P o s t m o d e r n  C o m p u t in g ’s  O R B e l in e
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ORBeline is a complete implementation of the CORBA specification 1.1. It 
provides all the features specified in the specification. ORBeline’s Smart Agent and 
Dynamic Directory Service provides an easy way for migration and replication of 
objects. Special features are fault-tolerance, failure recovery and event handling. 
ORBeline can interoperate with other major ORB products [38]. On the other hand, 
ORBeline only provides language bindings for C++. Other Common Object Services 
such as Persistent Object Services are not supported in the current version. The 
implementation o f persistent services and security (to be discussed in the next chapter) 
will be built on top of ORBeline to provide a complete CORBA framework for Object- 
Oriented Database Management System in a distributed environment. Advantages of 
ORBeline includes its availability and completeness to CORBA specification.
2 .2  P e r s is t e n t  O b je c t  S t o r e s
Object-Oriented Database Systems (OODSs) became available on the market in 
late 1980s. Many object-oriented database systems are currently available from both 
commercial vendors and educational institutions. Earlier OODSs are 0 2  [2] [15][27][28], 
Orion [24], and Iris [18]. Object Store from Object Design, Inc. [25] is one o f the latest 
generation of commercial OODSs. Many OODSs are developed by research laboratories 
and educational institutions such as Exodus from University o f Wisconsin, Madison 
[9][ 10], ODE and EOS from AT&T Bell Labs [5], OBST from Forschungszentrum 
Informatik, Germany [11], and Texas Persistent Store from University o f Texas, Austin
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[52], Before we move on to the next section, two terms, persistent object and transient 
object will be defined. The term “persistent object” can be defined as an object which is 
valid beyond the life-time of the process that created it [23]. On the other hand, transient 
object’s lifetime ends when the process that created it terminates. In the following, we 
provide a brief discussion of a database architecture which is based on Texas Persistent 
Store, Exodus and EOS.
2 .2 .1  T e x a s  P e r s is t e n t  S t o r e
Texas Persistent Store, developed at the University of Texas at Austin, is a 
persistent storage system written in C++. One o f the key feature of the design is the use 
o f pointer swizzling at page fault time. This technique makes use of the virtual memory 
management scheme available in most current systems. In Texas Persistent Store model, 
persistent objects are treated similarly as the transient objects. The only difference is 
persistent objects are loaded into virtual memory transparently from disk. Transient 
objects are resident in the memory throughout their life. Therefore, it is not necessary to 
distinguish between persistent objects and transient objects in the client code.
Objects can be retrieved by name in Texas Persistent Store model. W hen a rooted 
object is requested by name, a page of virtual memory is reserved and protected. The 
actual object will not be loaded into the reserved page until the object is actually 
referenced. If the rooted object, has been page faulted into virtual memory, then a page 
will be reserved and protected for each successor object from the root. This process will 
be continued in this manner. Hence, pages of virtual memory are reserved one pointer 
ahead for each object being page faulted into virtual memory [52].
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The technique of pointer swizzling at page fault time has also been used in the 
commercial product, ObjectStore [25]. The main advantage o f this technique is 
providing an efficient method for a high performance object storage system.
2.2.2 EXODUS
EXODUS is one of the extensible DBMS projects developed in late 80s and early 
90s at the University of Wisconsin, Madison [7]. The goal of the project is to develop a 
set o f primitive DBMS facilities for constructing application specific DBMS. One o f the 
m ajor facilities of EXODUS is the storage manager which provides the basic procedures 
for file operations such as file creation, deletion and scans. It also provides procedures 
for storing and destroying objects from a file. Small objects and large objects are treated 
differently in EXODUS. Objects that can be stored in one page are treated as small 
objects. The storage manager will automatically convert an object to a large object if it 
exceeds the size limit of a page. The object identifier (OID) of a small object points to 
the disk location o f the object. For the large object, its OID points to the object header 
instead. A large object is an uninterpreted byte sequences. It is represented as a B+ tree 
index on byte position within the object plus a collection of leaf blocks [9].
EXODUS provides another way to support persistence with the introduction of E 
language. The E language is an extension of C++. It defines the DB (database) attributes 
and a couple o f predefined classes for manipulation of persistent objects. Generic classes 
for unknown types are also added to enhance the development of database 
implementation. Generic classes can be used with one or more unknown types within the 
class definition. Type information can be provided when the class is actually declared.
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The idea of generic class is very similar to the template class of C++ which has been 
introduced in the later version of C++.
The successor of EXODUS is Scalable Heterogeneous Object REpository 
(SHORE) which was developed at the University of W isconsin at Madison [10]. The 
objective o f SHORE is to provide heterogeneous object management for object-oriented 
database and file systems. A parallel version of SHORE has also been developed which 
is built on top of PV M 1 for interprocess communication [10].
2 .2 .3  E O S
EOS is a storage manager developed at AT&T Bell Labs [6] for high 
performance DBMSs. The EOS is serving as the storage manager for the OODBMS, 
ODE which is also developed at AT&T Bell Labs. EOS provides extensive support for 
large objects. Objects can be named and retrieved by name efficiently. EOS also follows 
the ODM G-93 standards proposed by the Object Database M anagement Group [12] to 
provide persistent reference to an object type.
Objects are stored in the database or storage areas which can be UNIX files or 
raw disk partitions. Storage areas can be shared or private. The EOS server will control 
the access for multi-users for the shared areas. Users can create private areas on local 
machine for faster performance. In EOS, there are two kinds o f object representations, 
file objects and ordinary objects. File objects are objects which are related. This 
approach provides a mechanism for sequential scanning o f objects within a file. Ordinary
1 PVM is a set of message passing libraries written in C or Fortran for 
implementation of parallel programs in a heterogeneous environment [20].
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objects and file objects have object headers attached to them. The object header contains 
information of the object such as the object length, whether the object is named or 
unamed and so on. The header only occupies two bytes of space. A handle is a object 
reference from which we use it to perform object operation. An object handle must be 
obtained first before one can operate the object. The handle contains the address o f the 
object in the EOS buffer pool. The page where the object is located will then be locked. 
W hen the object handle is released, the page will be unlocked.
The way EOS defined large and small objects is similar to EXODUS. A small 
object is an object which can fit into one page, the object is large otherwise. Users will 
see no differences in accessing small or large objects. In addition, EOS provides access 
to portions of an object. It is useful for handling a very large object [6].
EOS is a rather complete implementation o f a persistent object store. It has all the 
basic features for a data storage system such as concurrency control, logging, transaction 
commit and abort, checkpoint, and recovery from system crash. It can be extended by 
associating actions with certain primitive events. Primitive events are low-level events 
such as page fault, object fault, transaction commit and so on. In our complete 
implementation of a distributed OODBMS based on CORBA, EOS has been used to 
serve as a persistent object store. EOS has both C and C++ bindings. There are several 
advantages for choosing EOS as the persistent store over the others. First of all, EOS has 
a C++ binding and actually EOS is implemented in C++. Secondly, EOS is a more 
complete database system which provides reliable functionalities. Moreover, EOS 
provides persistent reference ability which conforms to the ODMG-93 standards [12]. 
Lastly, EOS is very easy to use and to install when compared to EXODUS and Texas
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Persistent Store. Even though EOS provides a client-server architecture, one can still use 
the CORBA structure to handle all requests and operations to the persistent store. Clients 
can send requests to the server o f the persistent storage only through the Object Request 
Broker (ORB) rather than the default communication routines provided by EOS.
So far, we have gone through some basic concepts of the Common Object 
Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), three commercial implementation o f CORBA, 
and three persistent storage systems. In the next section, we will discuss some of the 
security models for our environment. We will focus more on the security models for the 
object-oriented database management system (OODBMS).
2 .3  S e c u r it y  M o d e l s
Distributed object-oriented databases provide real-life relationships to the stored 
objects. M aintenance of the complex object relations and distribution o f processing over 
a network pose some challenges for the database security which addresses the issues of 
confidentiality, integrity and denial of service [35]. Various models for security have 
been proposed for dealing with this complex system. Generally speaking, we can divide 
these models into two categories; namely, mandatory access control and discretionary 
access control. Mandatory security mechanisms are used to enforce multilevel security 
by classifying the data and users into various security levels and then implementing the 
appropriate security policies of the organization [17]. Such policies are necessary to 
fulfill the requirements set by some organizations such as the Department o f Defense 
(DoD) [14]. On the other hand, discretionary security mechanisms are identity-based 
access control policies. They usually grant privileges to users including capability to
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read, write, or update specific data.
In the following sections, we will discuss, in detail, multilevel security including 
the concept of polyinstantiation. Next, we will move our focus on some discretionary 
security models such as negative and positive authorizations, strong and weak 
authorizations, and finally roles model.
2 .3 .1  M u l t il e v e l  S e c u r it y  M e c h a n is m s
The concept of multilevel security comes with the classification of users in 
computer systems. A user who attempts to access specific classification o f data requires 
clearance for such classification or higher security privileges. Thus, there is a 
hierarchical sensitivity level in a security classification system such as Top-secret, Secret, 
Confidential and Unclassified. In addition, there is also a set o f nonhierarchical 
categories in association with the hierarchical sensitivity level [30]. For example, a user 
having clearance for the secret level can access information classified in that level or 
lower such as confidential and unclassified. However, this user can not access 
information on the top-secret level. On the other hand, users who want to access 
information on a specific security level and in a specific category are required to have 
clearance for both.
Most commonly used models for multilevel security are defined in the Bell and 
LaPadula security model [4]. This model classifies each subject such as user, account or 
program, and object such as relation, tuple, column or operation into one o f the security 
classifications, Top-secret, Secret, Confidential or Unclassified. For simplicity, we only 
use these four security classifications to describe the model. There are two properties or
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restrictions for the subject and object classifications:
1. Simple security property: A subject S is not allowed to have “read” access to an 
object O Unless Class i f icat ion(S)>Classi f icat ion(0) .
2. *-property: A subject S is not allowed to have “write” access to an object O unless
classif icat ion(S) < c lass i f icat ion(O).
It is obvious that the simple security property guarantees that no subject can read 
an object whose security classification is higher than the classification o f the subject. The 
*-property prohibits a subject from writing into an object that has lower security 
classification than that of the subject. This property prevents information flow from 
higher to lower security level.
The multilevel classification system leads to the concept of polyinstantiation. 
Polyinstantiation arises where several tuples can have the same primary key but have 
different attribute values for users in different classification level. The situation arises 
because of the simple security property which allows users with higher classification to 
read attributes of objects with equal or lower classification level. Therefore, users with 
higher security level will be able to read more information from the same primary key of 
the search than users with lower security level [46].
Even though most of the commercial DBMSs use discretionary access control 
mechanisms, multilevel security is still required in government, military and corporate 
applications. Operating systems such as UNICOS for Cray Supercomputers incorporate 
an option for using multilevel security to handle the user access on the system.
2.3.2 D isc r e t io n a r y  Se c u r it y  M ec h a n ism s
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Discretionary access control models usually involves granting and revoking 
privileges. Many relational DBMSs, such as Oracle, use this technique for database 
access. ORION, one o f the early development of OODBMSs, has developed a formal 
model o f discretionary security for object-oriented databases [47][48]. The model is 
comprised o f positive and negative authorization. The notion of strong and weak 
authorization was also introduced in that model [31].
The Department of Defense (DoD) has provided metrics for secure systems. The 
metrics divide security level into 7 levels, A l, B3, B2, B l, C2, C l and D, with A1 the 
most secure and D the least. Secure systems at level C l and C2 must provide 
discretionary access control. For level B l and up, systems must provide both 
discretionary and mandatory access control. In the following sections, three of the 
discretionary security models, positive and negative authorizations, strong and weak 
authorizations, and roles will be discussed.
2.3.2.1 P o sit iv e  a n d  N e g a t iv e  A u t h o r iz a t io n s
Positive and negative authorizations are sufficient to satisfy the requirement at 
Class B3 for the criteria set by the DoD. Positive authorizations explicitly specify users’ 
right to access information while negative authorizations explicitly deny users from 
accessing the information.
Implementation of such authorized schemes requires an object to carry two lists, 
one for positive authorization and the other for negative authorization. A user must
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belong to an object’s positive authorization list in order to have access permission on the 
object. On the other hand, a user must not belong to the negative authorization list in 
order to access the object. A combination o f the positive and negative authorizations 
provides an easy way to achieve the goal of discretionary access control. However, as 
pointed out by Rabitti et al. [47][48], there is a situation where the positive 
authorizations may conflict with the negative authorizations [47][48]. For example, if  a 
user has been put in both the positive and negative authorization lists, it is not clear 
whether the system should allow or deny the user from accessing the object. This 
situation may not happen at the same object. However, since child objects inherit the 
properties from their parent objects, the situation might occur in which a user’s name is 
in the positive authorization list o f an object and the same user’s name is in the negative 
authorization list o f one of the descendents of the object. To solve this problem, the 
concept of strong and weak authorizations is introduced.
2 3 .2.2 S t r o n g  a n d  W e a k  A u t h o r i z a t i o n s
As in ORION, a strong authorization cannot be overridden by other authorization 
while a weak authorization can be overridden by a strong authorization. Therefore, the 
problem would be solved in the example described in the previous section if  we assign 
weak positive authorization in one place and strong negative authorization in the other 
for the same user. It is still possible to have conflicts such as weak positive authorization 
and weak negative authorization assigned for the same user at an object. However, this 
conflict can be detected by a simple tool which browses through the object hierarchy and 
finds the conflicts.
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Another approach has been suggested by Lunt [29] to solve the problem in 
positive and negative authorizations. Such an approach takes denials as higher 
precedence. This approach can also be interpreted as all negative authorizations to be 
strong and all positive authorizations to be weak. One advantage o f having precedence 
on denials is the assurance that specific users and groups cannot obtain authorization to 
an object without explicit authorization [31].
2.3.23  R o l e -B a se d  Sec u r it y
User roles have been used in several applications to provide discretionary access 
control. In UNIX, for example, there are certain built-in roles such as superuser, 
operator, system administrator, and so on. Each role have been granted certain privileges 
by the system. A system administrator can create a role for a particular purpose, delete a 
role or modify a role’s privilege. Named protection domains (NPDS) proposed by 
Baldwin [1] is a facility for specifying user roles. Other research has been done to 
employ user-role model for object-oriented database security such as the models 
suggested by Ting et al. [57] and Nyanchama et al. [32][34].
Role-based security provides a flexible way to manage a large object hierarchy. 
Each role is provided with sufficient privileges to carry its function only and therefore 
role-based implementation is based on the principle of least privilege [56]. Roles can 
have overlapping privileges. The object-oriented hierarchy can apply to the role-based 
model. A role can be the child of another role. In this case, the child role will inherit all 
predefined privileges set from its parent role. The child role then can have other 
privileges not in its ancestor roles. Therefore, the role hierarchy can always be built from
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a basic role or root role which have minimal privileges. Child roles can be generated 
from the root role and other roles can be created in this manner.
Figure 3 shows a privilege graph suggested by Baldwin [1]. Each subject or user 
can be assigned one or more roles. Each role, on the other hand, is either assigned some 
privileges or inherits from other role(s). For example, subject A and B are both assigned 
to role o f Account Supervisor. The role Account Supervisor is a child of Account Clerk 
that implies Account Supervisor will have all the privileges from the role o f Account 
Clerk. Therefore Account Supervisor will have the privilege to Compile Accounts. In 
additional to this privilege, Account Supervisor also has privilege to Audit Accounts 
which Account Clerk does not have. It is also possible for a single subject to have more 
than one role. Subject G, for example, has been assigned to role o f Shipping Manager 
and System Administrator. Thus, Subject G will have the privileges o f creating Shipping 
Orders and Creating Computer Accounts.
The hierarchy graph of roles should preserve the acyclic property in order to 
provide decretionary access control over the privilege set. Nyanchama, et al. [34] 
presented a formal graph model for the acyclic role organization.
So far, we have discussed some of the existing models suitable for secure object- 
oriented database systems. Multilevel security is too restrictive in a way that may not be 
applicable to most commercial applications. Positive and negative authorizations are 
inherited with ambiguity which can be solved by an association with strong and weak 
authorizations. A role-based model is flexible and extendable such that we can extend 
this model to cover some of the features from multilevel security. Our design of security 
mechanisms on Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) will be based
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on the role-based model which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.
Subject(Users) Roles Hierarchy Privileges(Functionality)
Compile
Accounts
Account
Supervisor Account Clerk
Audit
AccountsGeneral Manager
Shipping Clerk
Shipping
OrderShipping Manager
Create
Computer
Accounts
System Administrator
£>  Child of relation
^  Assigned Role(s) or Privilege(s)
Figure 3: Baldwin’s Privilege Graph
2 .4  T h e s is  C o n t r ib u t io n s
The multi-level security requirements provide guidelines for designing a security 
model. The guidelines are necessary to assert the validity o f the security model. The role- 
based security model provides a fundamental model for user authentication. However, 
the object relationships of roles can cause conflicts in resolving the user privileges. The 
addition of positive and negative, and strong and weak authorizations can help to resolve 
these conflicts. These issues are going to be discussed in chapter 4.
The persistent object store provides a physical storage for storing persistent
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security information for the role-based security design. EOS by the AT&T Bell 
Laboratories is the persistent object store in our implementation. EOS is also ODM G’93- 
compliant which simplify the implementation of the persistent object service for 
CORBA.
ORBeline by the PostModern Computing provides a basic CORBA 
implementation. It provides the Interface Definition Language compiler for 
preprocessing interface definitions. The security and persistent object services are 
implemented on top of ORBeline.
2 .5  S u m m a r y
Evaluation of existing distributed object technologies is one o f the objective of 
this thesis. In section 2.1, the general framework of CORBA is explained. Three 
commercial CORBA implementations, IBM ’s DSOM, Sun M icrosystem ’s NEO and 
PostM odern Computing’s ORBeline are evaluated. IBM ’s DSOM includes more 
common object services which provide additional functionalities for distributed 
application. NEO by Sun M icrosystem has recently incorporated with Java as its front 
end interface. The widely adopted internet programming language Java may lead NEO to 
be a leading CORBA implementation for internet users.
Two o f the persistent object stores, Texas Persistent Store and EXODUS are 
developed in academic institutions while EOS is developed by AT&T Bell Labs. The 
major differences among them is the ease of use and installation. EOS is best o f the 
three. It provides minimal set of functions to manage persistent objects. It also provides 
object clustering for creating file object to allow efficient mechanism for object
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management. EOS is designed to handle both large and small objects.
Finally, the discretionary security models provide primary concepts for the design 
of our security service. Our design can also be extended to a multilevel security model.
The next chapter discusses three persistent protocols for designing the persistent 
object service. The design and implementation of our persistent object service is 
explained with the use o f EOS as the persistent object store.
C h a p t e r  3
D e s ig n  a n d  I m p le m e n ta t io n  
o f  P e r s i s t e n t  O b j e c t  
S e r v ic e  U s in g  CORBA
3.1  In t r o d u c t io n  t o  P e r s is t e n c e
An object whose lifetime is transient is allocated memory that is managed by the 
programming language run-time system. Sometimes a transient object is declared in the 
heading of a procedure and is allocated memory from the stack frame created by the 
programming language run-time system when the procedure is invoked. That memory is 
released when the procedure returns. Other transient objects are scoped by a process 
rather than a procedure activation and are typically allocated to either static memory or 
the heap by the programming language system. When the process terminates, the 
memory is deallocated. An object whose lifetime is persistent is allocated memory and 
storage managed by the ODBMS run-time system. The objects continue to exist after the 
procedure or process that creates them terminates [12]. The goal of creating a persistent 
object service using CORBA is to provide common interfaces for Object Request 
Brokers (ORBs) to restore and to manage the persistent state of objects [41]. The 
persistent object service will be used in converting a dynamic/transient object to a
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persistent object. Dynamic object is volatile and is typically resided in memory. System 
failures, for instances, will end the lifetime of a dynamic object. To preserve the 
persistent state o f an object, means should be provided to transfer contents o f objects 
from memory to physical storage such as disk. Persistent object service therefore serves 
this purpose for maintaining the object state persistence between virtual and physical 
storage. As shown in Figure 4, Persistent Object service will convert an object from its 
dynamic state to a persistent state and vice versa. In order for all ORBs to locate the 
desired object, a persistent handle or reference should be created for each persistent 
object. This handle identifies the location o f an persistent object. The persistent handle 
must be unique for different objects managed by the ORBs.
Object at 
Persistent 
State
Object at 
Dynamic 
State
Persistent Object Service
Figure 4: Function of Persistent Object Service
In the next few sections we shall describe several protocols from the specification 
of Common Object Services (COS) published by the Object M anagement Group (OMG) 
[41]. Then we shall discuss the ODM G’93 protocol on persistence. The design of our 
persistent model is similar to the ODM G’93 protocol and is also part of the COS 
specification. We now move on to our design and implementation o f the persistent store
using EOS developed by AT&T Bell Laboratory.
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3.2 OMG P e r sist e n t  O b je c t  S e r v ic e s  P r o to c o l s
Common Object Services Specification describes three basic protocols including 
the ODM G’93 protocol to support persistent object handling. CORBA already provides a 
persistent reference handling interface that is the object_to_string, string_to_object, 
release, and so on [41]. These operations allow conversion of object to type string and 
vice versa and should be sufficient for most o f object manipulation by clients. Three 
protocols will be discussed in this section; namely, the Direct Access Protocol (PDS_DA 
which stands for Persistent Data Store with Direct Access), the Dynamic Data Object 
(DDO) protocol and the ODM G’93 protocol.
3.2.1 T h e  D ir e c t  A ccess  (PDS_DA) P r o to c o l
Direct Access Protocol represents a persistent object as one or more 
interconnected data objects. The persistent data of an object is described as a single data 
object which might be a root of tree containing the object data. It is similar to represent a 
persistent object as a heap in some persistent object store. In the case o f multiple data 
object (an object consists of several instances of data objects), it requires object traversal 
from the root object followed by the stored object references.
It is necessary to define the type of each data object within an object. Fortunately, 
the Interface Definition Language (IDL) provided by CORBA includes the Data 
Definition Language (DDL) which can be used in describing object types during the 
interface definition.
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As shown in Figure 5, PDS_DA is an object reference to multiple data objects 
such as instances o f object A and object B. Each persistent object is represented by a 
PDS object reference handle (PDS_DA) in the figure. PDS can locate the data object 
references within a persistent object from the PDS_DA handle and thus it can perform 
operations on data object references to get and to modify the attributes of data objects. 
Attributes can be normal data types defined by DDL or can also be another object 
instance.
Direct Access Protocol is a simple and direct method to achieve persistence. 
Implementation of the protocol requires only interface preprocessing facility such as the 
Data Definition Language (DDL) or Interface Definition Language (IDL).
Figure 5: Direct Access Protocol Interfaces
3.2.2 T h e  D y n a m ic  D a ta  O bje c t  (DDO) P r o t o c o l
A Dynamic Data Object (DDO) is a Datastore-neutral representation o f an
r Object (Client of PDS) A
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object’s persistent data [41]. Datastore-neutral representation is the simplest form to 
describe an object data independent with datastore type. A DDO is an object containing 
all data o f a single object. Data contained in a dynamic data can be divided into three 
categories: description of a DDO, data item and data property. Data item comprises of 
data property and data item information. Figure 6 shows an example o f a DDO structure. 
The data item can store both data types and data methods o f an object.
DDO can be optimized in use with specialized types o f data store. It provides a 
fast and simple storage and retrieval mechanism for different types of data store.
a DDO
PID data_count = 2 object_type
a data item
data id = 1
data_name=”” data_value=any
property_cnt=2
a property
property_id=l
I property_name=””
property_value=any
a property
property _id=2
property _name=”
property_value=any
a data item
data_id = 2
data_name=”” data_value=any
property _cnt=l
a property
property _id= 1
property_name=v
property_value=any
Figure 6: Structure of a DDO [41]
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3.2.3 T h e  ODMG’93 P r o t o c o l
The OD M G’93 protocol proposed by the Object Database M anagement Group is 
similar to the Direct Access Protocol we discussed before. The only difference between 
them are that the ODM G’93 protocol uses an Object Definition Language (ODL) to 
define an object interface instead of using the Data Definition Language (DDL) and 
ODM G’93 protocol uses programming language mapping defined for data object 
specified in ODM G’93, rather than the CORBA IDL attribute operations [41]. The IDL 
attribute operations define the data types in interface definition.
After reviewing three protocols with two different approaches, our 
implementation of the persistent object service will use the Direct Access Protocol 
(PDS_DA). One reason of choosing this over the ODM G’93 protocol is that CORBA 
IDL already defines the DDL for writing the object interface, even though the OD M G’93 
protocol has been widely used by most database vendors. We have to rewrite a 
preprocessor compiler if we choose to use the ODM G’93 protocol. Conversion from the 
PDS_DA protocol to the ODM G’93 protocol is straightforward since the ODL can be 
easily interpreted as DDL. In the following section, we are going to discuss our 
persistent object service in use with the EOS storage manager developed by AT&T Bell 
Laboratories.
3 .3  D e s ig n  o f  t h e  P e r s is t e n t  O b j e c t  S e r v ic e
Our aim is to provide persistent object services for one or more datastore 
interconnected through the CORBA communication layer. To achieve this goal, our
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design should be able to adapt different object data stores. Throughout this section, we 
will provide a high level overview o f our design.
We use a Persistent Object Manager (POM) to identify the object type, data store 
and the corresponding persistent data store for an object. POM contains a table o f object 
type, datastore type and persistent data store. In our implementation, each persistent 
object has a persistent ID which is a combination of the type, location and name o f an 
object. When the POM receive a request from client to set or get an object, the client will 
pass the PID of the specified object. The POM can then locate the object information 
from the PDS registry and identify the protocol and data store to store or to restore the 
object.
Figure 7 shows the role of POM to handle requests from different clients and to 
establish connections between clients and persistent data stores. We plan to use EOS as a 
persistent object store for our Role security model. Client 1 will first send request to the 
POM for retrieving information of the Role graph object with pidl which is the 
persistent ID for the object. The POM will then look up the object location at the 
persistent datastore (pdsl) from the registry with the information submitted by the client. 
Afterward, a connection will be established between the client 1 and the EOS data store 
(pdsl). Client will not know in which protocol or datastore the object is located. All the 
transparency is handled by the POM and the Object Request Brokers (ORBs). Similar 
approach can be used if we would like to add on capabilities to handle different object 
stores such as ObjectStore by Object Design, Inc. [25] and Versant. There are no strict 
rules for using protocols with different object stores. Figure 7 just shows an example for 
various combination of protocols and data stores.
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Figure 7: The role of POM
There are dependency issues regarding different methods for object management 
with different data stores. Therefore, we need to provide interfaces for different data 
stores. Figure 7 has shown another key component other than the POM that is the pds’s. 
For example, pdsl and pds2 are required for EOS and ObjectStore respectively. A PDS, 
persistent data store, is a data store and protocol dependent interface. To be specific,
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there are two basic functionalities of PDS.
1. Interacting with the object to retrieve and to store data in and out using a specific 
protocol which has been discussed earlier in this chapter.
2. Interacting with the data store to retrieve and to store an object. In our case, we will 
provide an interface for handling objects in and out from EOS storage manager.
In the following section, we will focus on our implementation o f the persistent 
object service.
3 .4  I m p l e m e n t a t io n  o f  P e r s is t e n t  O b j e c t  S e r v ic e
Throughout this section, we will explain our implementation o f the persistent 
object service in details by providing both CORBA IDL interfaces and our C++ class 
definitions. IDL interfaces, in general, provide a high level description o f object classes 
and will directly map to C++ classes by the IDL compiler. Classes generated by IDL 
interfaces involving virtual base classes which should be implemented by implementors.
3 .4 .1  P e r s is t e n t  Id e n t if ie r  (P ID )
In order for the Persistent Object M anager (POM) to locate a persistent object, 
each persistent object is associated with an unique ID. In our implementation, a PID 
consists of a datastore type o f an object, a object ID to identify the object in a specific 
data store, and a hostname or an IP address o f the datastore. The IDL interface is very 
simple and is shown in Figure 8. It contains an object PID with a member datastore_type 
and a member function get_PIDString() to get the PID in CORBA::String format.
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module CosPersPID { 
interface PID {
attribute string datastore_type; 
string get_PIDString();
} ;
} ;
Figure 8: IDL for the Persistent ID interface
To implement the actual function, we need to create a derived class from the 
CosPersPID module. The definition of the derived class is shown in Figure 9. We are 
showing both the whole IDL interface and its class implementation only at this simple 
introduction. We will only give the important part of the codes for other interfaces.
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class PosPID: public CosPersPID_impl::PID_impl 
{
private:
CORBA::String _datastore_type;
CORBA::String _id;
CORBA::String _ip;
CORBA::String *_pid; 
public:
PosPID(const char *datastore, const char *id, const char *ip)
: _datastore_type(datastore), _id(id), _ip(ip), _pid(NULL)
{ )
-PosPID() {}
CORBA::String* datastore_type(); I I function to return 
datastore type
void datastore_type(const CORBA::Strings val); I I function 
to set datastore type
CORBA::String* get_PIDString(); // function to get PID as a
Figure 9: Persistent ID derived class
3.4.2 P e r s is t e n t  D a t a  S t o r e  u s in g  EOS
EOS is an efficient object database developed by AT&T Bell Labs. In EOS, data 
objects are stored in one or more EOS storage areas which are preformated by an EOS 
area format routine. Each storage area consists of a bundle of pages. The size of a page 
can be preset to a certain extent prior to formatting the storage area. A data object can be
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stored at one or more page depending on its size. Object stored in EOS are identified by 
a unique name or an object ID. EOS provides a set of routines to retrieve an object 
handle from which our client can reach the object and perform operations.
We have implemented a set of basic routines to allow the Direct Access Protocol 
to connect to and to disconnect from the EOS data store, plus operations to store, to 
restore and to remove objects. The IDL for the Persistent Data Store module is shown in 
Figure 10.
module CosPersPDS { 
interface Object {}; 
interface PDS {
PDS connect (in Object theobj, in CosPersPID::PID p); 
void disconnect (in Object theobj, in CosPersPID::PID p) ; 
void store (in Object theobj, in CosPersPID::PID p);
Object restore (in Object theobj, in CosPersPID::PID p); 
void remove (in Object theobj, in CosPersPID::PID p);
} ;
} ;
Figure 10: IDL declaration of the Persistent Data Store (PDS)
Subsequently, we define a derived class from CosPersPDS module for the client 
to connect to the EOS data store. Figure 11 shows the class definition for the persistent 
data store. An persistent object is represented by an instance o f class PosPDS where the 
object handle is _obj_data and can be obtained through a series of database operations.
Typically, the Object Request Broker needs to “connect” to a EOS server first. Then, we 
can perform various database operations such as to “store” and to “remove” an object. 
M ember functions such as “trans” , “createfile”, “openfile” , “closefile” and “com m it” are 
private operations necessary to establish connection to the EOS storage manager and are 
only used by the member functions themselves. EOS handles objects by the object 
handle. An object can be identified by its Object ID (OID) or its object name.
3 .5  S u m m a r y
We have designed and implemented a persistent data service with EOS as the 
data object storage. This is an add-on persistent facility for the CORBA implementation 
o f ORBeline by Post Modern Computing. In the next chapter, we shall describe how to 
add security to CORBA. We also explain in detail its design and implementation.
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class PosPDS: public CosPersPDS_impl::PDS_impl 
{
private:
CosPersPDS::Object *_obj_data;
int trans(); 
int createfile(); 
int openfile(); 
int closefile(); 
int commit(); 
long getobjsize(); 
public:
CosPersPDS::PDS* connect(CosPersPDS::Object* obj ,
CosPersPID::PID* p);
void disconnect(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p); 
void store(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p); 
CosPersPDS::Object* restore(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, 
CosPersPID::PID* p);
void remove(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p);
F igu re  11: C lass  defin ition  o f  the P ersis ten t D a ta  S tore
C h a p t e r  4
D e sig n  a n d  Im p l e m e n t a t io n  
o f  A  Se c u r e  O b je c t  Se r v ic e
Security is still a missing component from CORBA specification 2.0 released in 
Fall 1995 [40]. The Object Management Group is currently requesting proposals for 
adding a security service to CORBA. All existing CORBA implementations rely on the 
system level security as the underlying security mechanism. System level security such 
as the UNIX system security mechanism is not designed for management of object 
entities. It is designed to handle file systems and control of processes. In this chapter, we 
propose our security model which can not only handle object entities but also be 
extended to meet the multilevel security requirement. This chapter is divided into two 
main parts. First section will provide a high level design of the role security model. We 
will discuss several authorization schemes to handle specific needs for the role model. 
Second section will focus on the actual implementation of the role model. We will 
present our role graph management algorithms and implementation o f the security 
service on CORBA.
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4.1  D e s ig n  o f  t h e  R o l e  S e c u r it y  M o d e l
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We have discussed different types o f security mechanisms including multilevel, 
discretionary, authorizations and role-based security models in Chapter 2. Our task is to 
design and implement a security service add-on to a CORBA implementation. The 
security service should be extendable to different levels of security requirements set by 
the DoD. In the following sections, we will introduce our basic design o f a role security 
model. Then, we will add on various authorization schemes to cover the limitations of 
the role model. In addition, an abstract model o f the design described in a Booch 
diagram [7] will be discussed at the end.
4 .1 .1  T h e  R o l e  M o d e l
A role model consists of a collection o f privileges and a set of users who can 
access the role. Privilege is an access right for system information. A role can inherit the 
privilege from other roles. Before presenting our design model, we will use the following 
definition throughout this section.
Definition 3: 4> is a universal set of roles.
Definition 4: Privilege set: P(%)  is the privilege set o f role %.
Definition 5: Senior Role: Let 91 be a set of roles. Role % is a senior o f role 91 if  and 
only if Vi|/((v|/ e  91) -> (P (\|/) c  />(%)))
Definition 6: Junior Role: A role V)/ is a junior role o f role % if and only if 
( P ( V ) c P ( x ) )
We also define a super role which is the senior role of all other roles within the
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role graph. The duty o f the super role is to maintain the role graph. A User that belongs 
to the super role can add a new role to and delete a role from a role graph. Role graph 
modification can be only performed by users that belong to the super role. In a 
distributed database system, it may be impossible to have a super role which can manage 
all databases distributed in a wide area network. In our design, the super role exists only 
in local area network.
We design our role model as a graph containing all roles for a local area network. 
The role graph is an acyclic directed graph. Graph traversal is unidirectional. Senior roles 
can access their junior roles, but not the reverse. This prevents data from being accessed 
by users without necessary security clearance. Senior roles also inherit the privileges of 
their junior roles. Figure 12 shows a graphical model of a role graph. It is represented as 
a multi-level role tree. The role tree is a hiearchical structure in which the superior roles 
have rights to access more system privileges. The role graph shown in Figure 12contains 
redundant role paths. For example, role B can reach role L from path BL or from paths 
BE and EL. Paths BE and EL already implies role L is a junior role o f both role B and 
role E. Therefore, we can remove the path BL without altering the privilege set of role B 
and role E.
Figure 13 shows the simplified version of the previous role graph with minimum 
redundancy. Each role still preserves its system privileges as the previous graph. The 
graph still have more than one path to a particular role, but we can not eliminate the 
paths since the system privileges among those roles will be changed. Two more 
properties will be added on top of the role-based security model and they will be 
discussed in the following two sections.
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Figure 12: A typical role graph
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F ig u re  13: S im plified  ro le  g raph  w ith  m in im um  red u n d an cy
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4 .1 .2  I m p l ic it  a n d  E x p l ic it  P r iv il e g e s
In our role graph design, a role can have two different kinds of privileges. One is 
explicit privilege which belongs to the privilege set associated with the role. The other is 
implicit privilege which belongs to the privilege sets associated with the junior roles. In 
order to obtain both the implicit and explicit privileges o f a role, we need to perform a 
role graph traversal along the role paths. In general, we will perform a Breadth First 
Search (BFS) to collect both the implicit and explicit privileges for a role.
4 .1 .3  A u t h o r i z a t io n  P r o p e r t ie s
4 .1 .3 .1  P o s it iv e  a n d  N e g a t iv e  A c c e s s  C o n t r o l
It is necessary to have positive and negative authorization in a role graph 
implementation. Positive authorization is used to explicitly grant access to a set of users. 
Negative authorization is used to deny access rights to a set of users. Thus, each role will 
incorporate a list o f users who have rights to access the current role and a list o f users 
whose access will be denied to the current role. This explicit access and denial properties 
is mandatory to fulfill the DoD multilevel security requirements [14].
4 .1 .3 .2  W e a k  a n d  S t r o n g  A c c e s s  C o n t r o l
Positive and negative authorization may cause conflict under certain situations. 
Figure 14 shows an example of a conflict resulting from improper role graph 
management. User Sam is in both the access and denial lists o f Role A. Should we allow
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or deny the access to Sam? To preserve minimum access rights for users, we assign the 
denial list to have stronger authorization than access list. Therefore, in this example, Sam 
does not have access rights to role A.
Role A 
Access list: Sam, Susan 
Denial list: Ann, Joan, Sam
Role B Role C
Figure 14: Example of conflicts between access and denial list
4 .1 .4  R o l e  G r a p h  M a in te n a n c e  P r o p e r t ie s
4 .1 .4 .1  R o l e  A d d it io n  a n d  D e l e t i o n
Any operation performed on a role graph must preserve the consistency o f the 
security infrastructure. After adding a new role to a role graph, the acyclic property must 
be preserved. When a new role is being added, new paths are generated from its 
immediate senior and junior roles. Redundant edges are removed to minimize the edges 
in the graph. Figure 15 shows the result of removing redundant edges. After adding new 
role X, edge BC and edge AC can be removed since they can be replaced by edge BX 
and XC, and AX and XC respectively.
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o f Role X
Addition of 
R oleX
after addition 
of R oleX
Figure 15: Addition of new role
Senior Roles Senior Roles Senior Roles
Inherit role property After deletionBefore deletion
Figure 16: Deletion of role
On the other hand, when a role is deleted, edges associated with the deleted role
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are removed at the same time. New edges are added to preserve the role hierarchy o f the 
role graph. Figure 16 shows the deletion of role X. W hen role X is deleted from the 
graph, without proper modification, role A and role B will no longer be the senior role of 
role C. In that case, the privilege sets of role A and role B are reduced. In our design, we 
try to keep the roles inheritance to be the same after the role deletion so that role A and 
role B are still the senior roles of role C after the deletion. Therefore, we add new edges 
AC and BC to eliminate privilege reduction from deleting role X.
4 .1 .5  H ig h  L e v e l  D e s ig n  f o r  t h e  R o l e  M o d e l
During our design process, we employ the Booch Method [7] for designing 
object-oriented applications. It provides models for representing complex object 
relationships, class inheritance, access control among classes, and so on. Figure 17 
shows our design in a Booch Diagram. We summarize the basic components in the 
design model in the diagram.
Each icon with hyphenated line boundary in the diagram represents a class. We 
have two abstract classes CosRID and CosRoles. CosRID represents the common object 
service for manipulation on role identifier while CosRoles represents the common object 
service for operation on Roles. The little triangle with a letter ‘A’ indicates that the class 
is abstract. These abstract classes should be defined in the interface using the Interface 
Definition Language (IDL) in order to allow the Object Request Broker to locate the 
objects. Class CosRID is a basic class to handle the Role identifier (RID) which is the 
key to identify a role. Class RID is derived from class CosRID and therefore class RID 
inherits all the methods of class CosRID. RID consists of three attributes; a role ID, a
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hostname/IP address and a role name. Two member operations are necessary to retrieve 
the role ID and the role name.
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Figure 17: Booch diagram of our Role graph design
Class idlRole is a virtual class which contains three virtual functions. Virtual 
functions are functions that will be defined in a derived class. Function “canAccess” 
checks if a user can access the current role. Function “inPrivatePrivilegeSet” checks if a
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user has explicit rights to access a specified privilege. Function “inUnionPrivilegeSet” 
checks if a user has implicit rights to access a specified privilege. The actual 
implementation o f these functions are done on the derived class Role. Class Role also 
includes four attributes; a privilege set containing the explicit privileges o f the role, a 
users’ access list containing a set of users who have rights to access the role, a users’ 
denial list containing a set o f users whose access to the current role will be denied, and a 
set o f junior roles.
Class idlRolesGraph contains three virtual functions which perform basic role 
graph maintainence such as adding a new role, updating an existing role and removing a 
role from the role graph. These operations require special properties which will be 
discussed in the next section. The actual implementation o f class idlRolesGraph is a 
class RolesGraph which has additional attributes and member functions. Function 
“isJunior” will check if a role x is a junior role of role y. The word junior role here can 
be implicit junior which simply means role x is a descendent of role y. The diagram also 
shows that the RolesGraph has access rights to the protected members of class Role. It is 
represented by the special strip and filled circle at class RolesGraph in the diagram.
We have described our design as an abstract model. The next section will present 
our implementation interfaces and class definition in details.
4 .2  I m p l e m e n t a t io n  o f  t h e  S e c u r it y  M o d e l
In this section, we first present our implementation o f roles. Then we show how 
the role implementation can be integrated as a CORBA service.
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4 .2 .1  R o l e  Im p l e m e n t a t io n
A role graph is the key o f our security model. During the implementation, the 
feature o f data hiding from C++ will help us to protect data and member functions from 
being accessed without access rights. Figure 18 shows the IDL of role module describing 
the two interfaces: the interface o f idlRole and the interface of idlRolesGraph. The 
interface idlRole performs a stand alone operation for a role such as checking access 
right for a user. The interface idlRolesGraph performs basic graph maintainence such as 
adding, deleting and updating a role in a role graph. In general, to check access rights of 
a user for a system privilege, we first find out a role X associated with the user and then 
check if the privilege is in the role’s union privilege set which is the union o f the 
privilege set of the role and its junior roles. It can be done by a simple traversal o f the 
nodes in the subtree headed by the role X.
Before a new role is added, we first check to see if  the acyclic property is 
preserved after addition. If  so, we add the new role and minimize the redundant paths 
within the role graph. Deletion requires new paths creation from the senior roles to the 
junior roles of the deleted role as explained in previous section.
#include "CosRID.idl" 
module CosRoles { 
struct auth_para { 
string login; 
string ip;
} ;
typedef sequence<string> seqld; 
typedef sequence<auth_para> seqAuth; 
typedef sequence<CosRID::idlRID> seqRid; 
interface idlRole {
boolean canAccess(in string login, in string ip);
boolean inPrivatePrivset(in string privld);
boolean inUnionPrivset(in string login, in string ip, in
string privID);
} ;
interface idlRolesGraph {
idlRolesGraph remove (in CosRID::idlRID rid); 
idlRolesGraph add (in seqRid seniorset, in idlRole role) 
idlRolesGraph update (in seqRid seniorset, in idlRole
new_role, in CosRID::idlRID rid);
) ;
} ;
Figure 18: IDL of Role Module
4.2.2 In t e g r a t io n  o f  Sec u r it y  Se r v ic e s  on  CORBA
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CORBA supports a collection of services that provide basic functions for using 
and implementing objects. Object services are necessary to construct in any distributed 
application and are always independent of application domains. Examples o f object 
services are naming service to bind or to resolve a name to an object relative to a naming 
context, event service to deliver asynchronous events, and life cycle service to define 
conventions for creating, deleting, copying and moving objects. Object services allow an 
add-on facilities capability for CORBA. We implemented our security service as a 
common object service on CORBA.
Client
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Object Implementation
ORB
Interface
Static IDL 
Skeleton
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Skeleton
ORB Core
V / / / / /A
Object
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V / / / / Z \  There may be multiple object adap ters 
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I 1 O RB-dependent interface
R equest from client
Up-call interface
Normal call 
interface
F igu re  19: C lien t requests m ech an ism  on  C O R B A
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Figure 19 shows how clients issue request for object implementation through the 
Object Request Broker (ORB). Client requests can come either from Dynamic 
Invocation Interface or from IDL stubs. When ORB receives a request from the client, it 
will try to locate the requested object implementation through communication with 
ORBs which are distributed in the network. After the ORB locates the object 
implementation, the request will pass to the object implementation through Object 
Adapters where all the Common Object Services are located. We have implemented our 
Security Service as a common object service registered to the object adapters. It is shown 
in Figure 20. Therefore, all requests are validated by the security service for their access 
rights.
Client Object Implementation
EKSH
IDL
Stubs
ORB Core
Security.Service
r \X \\V \J  Interface identical for all ORB im plem entations 
X / / / / / A  There may be multiple object adap ters
There are s tu b s  and a skeleton for each object type 
D ORB-dependent interface
Client request forward to  Object Implementation by ORB Core
F igu re  20: O b jec t im p lem en ta tion  rece iv ing  req u est th rough  the O b jec t A d ap te rs
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There are different kinds of object adapters for various uses. The Basic Object 
Adapter (BOA), for example, can be used for most ORB objects with conventional 
implementations. Our implementation uses the Basic Object Adapter to define our 
security services. Figure 21 shows the IDL implementation of the security service. In this 
example, we create a sample server which will be called by clients. The sample server 
will register itself during the start-up so that The ORB will first locate the host where the 
sample server is located and then the security services will check the access right of the 
client for the sample server. Exceptions will be raised if the client permission is denied.
struct SecurityAssoc 
{
string host_name;
SampleServerserver;
} ;
interface SecurityMonitor 
{
exception PermissionDenied {};
SampleServer get_server() raises ( PermissionDenied,);
) ;
Figure 21: IDL Implementation o f Security M onitor Service
Figure 22 shows the class definition for the Security M onitor Service. We 
implemented the SecurityEventHandler as a derived class from the BOA event handler 
class. SecurityEventHandler redefines the pre_method of the BOA event handler. Pre­
method o f the event handler will be invoked every time a client performs a method 
invocation on any method of the object implementation from server. The principal of the 
client, which includes a user ID and a hostname, the object’s interface and object names 
and environment are passed to this method. Once the SecurityEventHandler is registered
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to the BOA, any attempt to access server object implementation without proper security 
clearance will result in a permission denied exception being raised. Routines for access 
authorization have been discussed in the previous section.
class SecurityEventHandler: public CORBA::BOA::IMPLEventHandler 
{
protected:
void pre_method (const CORBA::Principal& princ, 
const char *interface, const 
CORBA::Object& obj,
CORBA::ULong methodid,
CORBA::Environments env);
} ;
class SecurityMonitorServer: public SecurityMonitor_impl 
{
friend SecurityEventHandler; 
public:
SecurityMonitorServer(const char *name) : 
SecurityMonitor_impl(name) {}
-SecurityMonitorServer() {}
SampleServer *get_server(CORBA::Environments env);
};
Figure 22: Class Definition for the Security M onitor Service
The next section is an example showing how to use the security services we 
designed and implemented to provide authorization controls over distributed object 
implementations.
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4 .3  A n  A p p l ic a t io n  E x a m p l e
This is an example to show the usage of our security services to perform access 
rights authentication. We have created a computational server which will perform a 
simple binary operation to multiply two real numbers. Clients will send request to obtain 
the result from this operation through the Object Request Broker (ORB). The ORB will 
locate the object implementation of the computational server from the network. Our 
security monitor services described in the previous section provide access rights 
authorization at the beginning o f any request for object implementations.
There are two kinds o f access rights authorizations in this example. The first 
authorization is performed prior to registration of the computational server to the ORB. 
This authorization provides security control for creating object implementations at the 
server side. This kind of security control can prevent users from creating insecure object 
implementations to release system information to unauthorized clients. The second 
authorization is performed when the client is requesting the computational server. The 
ORB will pass the client’s information to the security services which will then check the 
inherited role o f the client. If  the client belongs to a role which has access to the 
computational server, the ORB will pass the request to the computational server to 
perform the multiplication. Result will be returned to the client via the ORB. Otherwise, 
the ORB will inform the client that his/her permission to the computational server is 
denied. Both authorization tests are handled by the Security M onitor Server.
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int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
signal(SIGINT, sighandler);
MonitorServer server("SecurityMonitor"); 
int c ;
CORBA::BOA *boa = CORBA::BOA::instance();
// Create Role graph 
create_rolesgraph();
CORBA::Environment env; 
boa->event_handler(Sserver, env,
new SecurityEventHandler); 
if ( env.check_exception() ) {
cout << "Error registering event handler." << endl; 
cout << env;
}
CORBA: :BOA: :impl_is_ready() ; 
return 0;
)
Figure 23: Main function of Security M onitor Server
Figure 23 shows the main function of the Security M onitor Server (SMS) which 
is implemented using the Basic Object Adapter (BOA). At the beginning, we calls 
function create_rolesgraph to create a role graph and store it as a persistent object in 
EOS object store for later use. We then register the SMS to the BOA event handler and 
create an new security event handler for SMS. The purpose of the SMS is to monitor
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various computational server while the security event handler will perform pre-method 
authorization tests on any client requests. SMS will raise an exception if the 
authorization test o f the security event handler is failed. Otherwise, the ORB will 
continue to perform object request for the computational server.
void SecurityEventHandler::pre_method(const 
CORBA::Principals princ, ...) {
CORBA::String name;
CORBA::String hostname;
RolesGraph *persistent_rolesgraph;
CORBA::String priv("Access to comp, server"); 
name = princ.userName(); 
hostname = princ.hostName();
cout << "Checking validity for user " << name <<
" at host " << hostname << endl; 
persistent_rolesgraph = get_rolesgraph(); 
if (persistent_rolesgraph->checkSecurity(name, 
hostname, priv))
cout << "Security test passed!" << endl;
else
env.exception_value(new
CORBA::StExcep::NO_PERMISSION);
}
Figure 24: Class Implementation o f the Security Event Handler
Figure 24 shows the class implementation for the security event handler. The
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function will obtain the “Prinicipal” of the client information from the ORB. The 
“Principal” contains username, host name and other information of the client. Security 
event handler will then call the function “get_rolesgraph” to restore the persistent role 
graph from the EOS object store. The role graph has been stored in EOS during the 
initialization of the Security M onitor Server as shown in Figure 23. Finally, it calls the 
checkSecurity member function of RolesGraph to perform security check on client.
The function checkSecurity is shown in Figure 25. This function will first find 
out the associated role of the user which is represented by “user_role”. It returns error if 
the user does not associate with any role. Subsequently, we perform security check for 
the user to see if the user has access rights to create or to use the computational server. 
The function inUnionPrivset as shown in Figure 25 performs a Breadth First Search 
(BFS) to all the junior roles of the “user_role” to check if the privilege to create or to use 
the computational server is belongs to one o f its junior roles. If the client pass this final 
test, its request for the computational server will be proceeded by the ORB. Otherwise, 
an exception will be raised for denial permission.
This example shows the use of our security services to provide access rights 
authorization. The M onitor Security Server and the Security Event Handler used in this 
application can be reused for other distributed object applications using CORBA. The 
full implementation for role graph management, persistent object service, secure object 
services and the application example are provided in Appendix.
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CORBA::Boolean RolesGraph::checkSecurity(CORBA::String& login,
CORBA::Stringk ip, CORBA::Strings privXD){ 
int i; long rid=0; Role *user_role; 
for (i =0; i < _userinfo.length(); i++) { 
if ((_userinfo[i].login() == login) &&
(_userinfo[i].ip() == ip)) {
cout << "Username " << login << " exists." << endl; 
rid = _userinfo[i].rid_long(); 
break;
}
)
if (!rid) {
cout << "Can't find security information of user " << 
login << endl; 
return FALSE;
}
user_role = _node_ptr[rid];
if (!user_role->canAccess(login, ip) return FALSE; 
if (user_role->inUnionPrivset(login, ip, privID)) {
cout << "User " << login <<
" pass security clearance for " << privID << endl; 
return TRUE;
)
return FALSE;
}
Figure 25: Function to perform security check for a user
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4 .4  S u m m a r y
We have presented our design of the role-based security model and its 
implementation. We have also integrated the Security Service to CORBA. CORBA 
provides a nice communication layer for distributed client and server application. We 
find it very easy to implement distributed applications. Next chapter is a conclusion for 
this thesis. We shall discuss our implementation which concerns CORBA and suggest 
possible extension on CORBA and our security model.
C h a p t e r  5
Co n c l u d in g  R e m a r k s
5.1 S u m m a r y  o n  P e r s is t e n t  a n d  S e c u r it y  M o d e l s
Our design o f persistent model is based on some existing models and can provide 
the need to make our role graph persistence. Our security model, on the other hand, is a 
new attempt to use an object model to handle security. The model is implemented in C++ 
classes, but can be easily implemented on other non object-oriented languages. Security 
is still a missing component from CORBA specification 2.0 [40]. The Object 
M anagement Group has been requesting for a proposal for adding a security service to 
CORBA. All existing CORBA implementations rely on the system level security as the 
underlying security mechanism. Object entities contain real life relationship which is 
difficult to handle by general security models. The security prototype we have designed 
and implemented can not only handle object entities but also be extended to meet the 
multilevel security requirement. We can also extend our model to provide data 
encryption during the message passing between the client and server through the ORBs 
and the Security Services.
There are limitations in our security model, but they can be easily fixed. For
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example, the class of role and role graph make usage o f several pointer references to role 
objects and its private members. It is possible for computer hackers to obtain references 
to these pointers and hence creating security holes.
5 .2  I m p l e m e n t a t io n  Is s u e s  o n  C O R B A
CORBA is going to be a standard system for building distributed application in 
the future. It is not difficult to build applications on top of CORBA. However, CORBA 
IDL provides limited data types which limits the functionality of the IDL interface. We 
have implemented our Security Service on a heterogeneous network on coupled Sun 
Sparc stations running Solaris 2.4, Solaris 2.5 and SunOS 4.1.4. The Object Request 
Brokers can communicate efficiently to locate the desired object method across the 
network.
5 .3  F u t u r e  W o r k
There are still some concerns about the role of CORBA within the Object- 
Oriented Database Management System (OODBMS). ODBMS nowadays is required to 
support millions of fine-grained objects. Fast and efficient access to the objects is almost 
required by all applications. The role of CORBA is to provide a more efficient 
mechanism to handle millions o f distributed objects located across the internet. There are 
more issues to be considered such as how to provide locking transaction through 
CORBA between distributed data stores.
Other issues such as interoperability among various ORBs from different vendors 
are in the final testing process. IBM SOM, Expersoft, Orbix, Sunsoft NEO and other
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CORBA implementors are going to release their interoperability versions in few months. 
Sunsoft, PostM odem Computing and Iona have announced their Java front-end for their 
CORBA products which will allow internet access to object methods through CORBA. 
In the near future, CORBA will be the underlying layer for most o f the distributed 
applications.
APPENDIX I
PERSISTENT IDENTIFIER PROGRAM
#ifndef _posPID_h 
#define posPID h
class PosPID: public CosPersPID_impl::PID_impl 
{
private:
CORBA::String _datastore_type;
CORBA::String _id;
CORBA::String _ip;
CORBA::String *_pid;
public:
PosPID(const char *datastore, const char *id, const char *ip) 
: _datastore_type(datastore), _id(id), _ip(ip), _pid(NULL) 
{}
-PosPID() {}
CORBA::String* datastore_type();
void datastore_type(const CORBA::Strings val);
CORBA::String* get_PIDString();
} ;
#endif
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#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h> 
ttinclude "CosPersPID_s.hh"
#include "posPID.h"
CORBA::String* PosPID::datastore_type()
{
return &_datastore_type;
}
void PosPID::datastore_type(const CORBA::Strings val) 
{
_datastore_type = val;
}
CORBA::String* PosPID::get_PIDString()
{
int i ;
char newstring[255];
for (i = 0; i < _ip.length(); i++)
newstring[i] =  ip[i];
newstring[i] = '\0'; 
strcat (newstring, 
strcat (newstring, _id);
_pid = new CORBA::String(newstring); 
return _pid;
}
APPENDIX II
PERSISTENT OBJECT SERVICE PROGRAM
#ifndef _posPDS_h 
#define _posPDS_h 
#include "eos.h"
class PosPDS: public CosPersPDS_impl::PDS_impl 
{
private:
// Persistence related data
CosPersPDS::Object *_obj_data;
CosPersPID::PID *_pid; 
unsigned _refcount;
CORBA::String _datastore_type; 
long _obj_size;
I I Datastore (EOS) related data
eosdatabase *_eosdb; 
eosobj *_eosoh; 
eosfile *_eosfh; 
eosoid _eosoid;
CORBA::String _db_na 
CORBA: : String *_fnair
int trans(); 
int createfile(); 
int openfileU; 
int closefileU; 
int commit(); 
long getobjsize();
public:
PosPDS(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p)
: _obj_data(obj), _pid(p), _refcount(0), _fname(p- 
>get_PIDString()) {
// database descriptor 
// object handle 
// file handle 
I I object id
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_db_name = "/tmp/eos_area/roledatabase";
_datastore_type = "EOS.2.0.2";
}
-PosPDS();
CosPersPDS::PDS* connect(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* 
void disconnect(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p) ; 
void store(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p); 
CosPersPDS::Object* restore(CosPersPDS::Object* obj,
CosPersPID::PID* p);
void remove(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p); 
void setobjsize(long objsize);
void persRef(CosPersPDS::Object* obj1, CosPersPID::PID* pi, CosPer 
sPDS::Object* obj2, CosPersPID::PID* p2);
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "CosPersPDS_s.hh"
#include "posPDS.h"
char *stringtochars(char *outchars, CORBA::String *str)
{
int i ;
CORBA::String pidstring; 
pidstring = *str;
outchars = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char)*(str->length() + 1)); 
for (i = 0; i < str->length(); i++) {
outchars[i] = pidstring[i];
}
outchars [i] = 'Non­
return outchars;
PosPDS::-PosPDS()
{
_obj_data = NULL; 
delete [] _fname; 
delete [] _eosdb; 
delete [] _eosoh; 
delete [] _eosfh;
}
CosPersPDS::PDS* PosPDS::connect(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPer­
sPID: :PID* p)
{
cout << "_datastore_type " << _datastore_type << " p- 
>datastore_type "
<< *p->datastore_type() << endl; 
if (strcmp(_datastore_type, *p->datastore_type()) != 0) {
cerr << "Wrong datastore type!!" << endl; 
exit(-2);
}
if (_refcount >=2) {
disconnect(_obj_data, _pid);
}
// connect the object to its persistent state
if ((_eosdb = eosdatabase::open(_db_name, 0, 1, 0)) == NULL) { 
cerr << "Cannot create database " << _db_name << endl; 
return NULL;
) else if (transO == 0) {
cout << "trans" << endl; 
return NULL;
)
_refcount++; 
return this;
74
int PosPDS::trans()
{
if (eostrans::begin(0) != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot start transaction" << endl; 
return 0; // Failure
} else
return 1; // Sucess
int PosPDS::createfile()
{
if ((_eosfh = eosfile::create(_eosdb, *_fname)) == NULL) { 
cerr << "Cannot create file " << *_fname << endl; 
return 0;
} else
return 1;
int PosPDS::openfile()
{
char * fnameChars;
CORBA::String tmpstring;
int i ;
tmpstring = *_fname;
fnameChars = (char *) malloc(sizeof(char)*(_fname->length() + 1));
for (i =0; i < _fname->length(); i++) 
fnameChars[i] = tmpstring[i];
fnameChars[i] = '\0';
if ((_eosfh = eosfile::open(_eosdb, fnameChars)) == NULL) { 
cerr << "Cannot open file " << fnameChars << endl; 
return 0;
} else
return 1;
int PosPDS::closefile()
{
if (_eosfh->close() != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot close file" << endl; 
return 0;
) else
return 1;
int PosPDS::commit()
{
if (eostrans::commit() != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot commit transaction" << endl; 
return 0;
} else
return 1;
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void PosPDS::disconnect(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p)
{
if (_refcount < 1) {
cerr << "Cannot disconnect " << (char *) p->get_PIDString() << endl 
<< "_refcount = " << _refcount << endl;
exit (-2);
}
if (_eosdb->close() != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot close database" << endl; 
exit (-2);
} else {
_eosdb = NULL;
_eosoh = NULL;
_eosfh = NULL;
_pid = NULL;
_refcount--;
}
}
void PosPDS::store(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p)
{
// save the persistent state of an object
eosobj *eosoh; // object handle
char *pidchars; 
long strlength;
// Add routine to distinguish update and create later
// Preliminary verion: have not yet taken into account of concurrency 
I I control
if ((eosoh = eosobj::create((int) getobjsize(), _eosdb, obj)) == NULL)
{
cerr << "Cannot create persistent object" << endl; 
exit(-2);
)
_eosoid = eosoh->oid();
pidchars = stringtochars(pidchars, p->get_PIDString()); 
printf ("pidchars = %s\n", pidchars); 
eosoid tmpoid; 
eos_Ref_Any objRef;
if ((tmpoid = _eosdb->oid_of(pidchars)) == eosoid::null) 
cout << pidchars << " not exist" << endl; 
if (eosoh->name_set((const char *) pidchars) != 0) 
cerr << "Cannot set object name" << endl; 
cout << "Object name is " << eosoh->name() << endl; 
if (eosoh->release() != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot release object handle" << endl; 
exit(-2);
)
if (PosPDS::commit() == 0)
cerr << "Cannot commit transaction" << endl;
}
CosPersPDS::Object* PosPDS::restore(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPer­
sPID: :PID* p)
{
// loads the object's persistent state unless a store or other 
// mutating operation is performed on the persistent state
eosfilescan *eosfs; // filescan handle
char *pidchars;
pidchars = stringtochars(pidchars, p->get_PIDString());
if ((_eosoh = eosobj::get(_eosdb, pidchars, eosobj::HDR_ONLY)) == 
NULL) {
cerr << "Cannot get object handle" << endl; 
return NULL;
}
_obj_data = (CosPersPDS::Object *) _eosoh->mptr(); 
if (_eosoh->release() != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot release object" << endl; 
exit (-2);
)
if (commit() == 0)
cerr << "Cannot commit transaction" << endl; 
return _obj_data;
)
void PosPDS::remove(CosPersPDS::Object* obj, CosPersPID::PID* p)
{
// delete the object's persistent data from the datastore indicated 
//by the PID.
// Preliminary verion: have not taken into account of concurrency 
// control
eosobj *oh; 
char *pidchars;
pidchars = stringtochars(pidchars, p->get_PIDString()); 
if ((oh = eosobj::get(_eosdb, pidchars, eosobj::HDR_ONLY)) == NULL) 
cerr << "Cannot get object handle" << endl; 
exit(-2);
}
if (oh->destroy() != 0) {
cerr << "Cannot destroy object" << endl; 
exit(-2);
}
if (commit() == 0)
cerr << "Cannot commit transaction" << endl;
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void PosPDS::setobjsize(long objsize)
{
_obj_size = objsize;
}
long PosPDS::getobjsize()
{
return _obj_size;
}
void PosPDS::persRef(CosPersPDS::Object* obj1, CosPersPID::PID* pi, 
CosPersPDS::Object* obj2, CosPersPID::PID* p2)
{
I I save the persistent state of an object
eosobj *eosoh; // object handle
char *pidchars;
long strlength;
eos_Ref_Any *persobj;
eosoid tmpoid;
pidchars = stringtochars(pidchars, pl->get_PIDString());
*persobj = _eosdb->lookup_object(pidchars);
if (PosPDS::commit() == 0)
cerr << "Cannot commit transaction" << endl;
}
APPENDIX III
ROLE IDENTIFIER PROGRAM
#ifndef _RID_h 
#define _RID_h
#include "misc.h"
class RID: public CosRID_impl::idlRID_impl 
{
private:
long _id;
CORBA::String _ip;
CORBA::String _name;
public:
RID(const char ‘name, const char *ip) ; 
-RIDO {}
RID& operator=(RID &rid);
CORBA::String* get_RIDstring(); 
long get_RIDlong();
CORBA::String* get_RnameString();
} ;
ttendif
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#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include ./persist_store/CosPersPID_s.hh" 
#include ./persist_store/posPID.h"
#include "CosRID_s.hh"
#include "misc.h"
#include "RID.h"
RID::RID(const char *name, const char *ip)
{
char ridname[255]; 
int thisid;
_ip = ip;
_name = name; 
strcpy(ridname, name);
_id = hash(ridname);
)
RID& RID::operator=(RID &rid)
{
_ip = rid._ip;
_name = rid._name;
_id = rid._id;
return *this;
}
CORBA::String* RID::get_RIDstring()
{
CORBA::String *rid; 
char newstring[255];
itoa(_id, newstring);
rid = new CORBA::String(newstring); 
return rid;
}
long RID::get_RIDlong()
{
return _id;
}
CORBA::String* RID::get_RnameString()
{
CORBA::String *rid=new CORBA::String(_name); 
return rid;
}
APPENDIX IV
ROLE GRAPH PROGRAM
#ifndef _Roles_h 
#define _Roles_h
#include <seqmac.h>
#include "CosRoles_c.hh"
#include "RID.h"
enum {FALSE, TRUE};
enum STATUS {ALLOWED, DENIALED, UNKNOWN};
class Role;
class Item {
friend class List; 
friend class Role; 
friend class RolesGraph; 
private:
Role *val;
Item *next;
ItemfRole *value, Item *item = 0)
{
val = value; 
next = item;
}
} ;
class List 
{
public:
List ()
{
list = 0; 
at_end = 0; 
current = 0 ;
_length = 0;
}
-List () { remove(); }
CORBA::Boolean append(Role* node); I I TRUE if append is success
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I I  FALSE if node already exists
Role *iterator(); I I  Return first item value on the list 
CORBA::Boolean remove(Role* node); // TRUE if node is deleted 
// FALSE if node doesn't exist 
I I  or list is empty
Role *remove_first(); // remove first role
List& operator=(List Scl);
void remove!); // Remove all items
CORBA::Boolean is_present(Role *node);
CORBA::Boolean is_empty();
void reset_current(); I I  Reset current pointer 
long length();
void display(); 
private:
Item *list;
Item *at_end;
Item ‘current; 
long _length;
) ;
class Role: public CosRoles_impl::idlRole_impl 
{
private:
CosRID::idlRID *_rid;
CosRoles::seqld _privset;
CosRoles::seqld _union_privset;
CosRoles::seqAuth _accessList;
CosRoles::seqAuth _denialList;
CosRoles::seqld *getPrivset();
CosRoles::seqAuth *getAccessList();
CosRoles::seqAuth *getDenialList();
public:
Role(CosRID::idlRID *rid, CosRoles::seqld privset,
CosRoles::seqAuth accessList,
CosRoles::seqAuth denialList, List *juniorList)
: _rid(rid), _privset(privset), _accessList(accessList), 
_denialList(denialList), _juniorList(juniorList)
{} ;
RoleO {};
-Role() ;
Role& operator=(Role &r);
I I  Check if this login with this ip can access this role or not. 
CORBA::Boolean canAccess(const CORBA::StringSc login,
const CORBA::String& ip);
CORBA::Boolean inPrivatePrivset(const CORBA::Strings privID); 
CORBA::Boolean inUnionPrivset(const CORBA::StringSc login,
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const CORBA::String& ip, 
const CORBA::Strings privID);
CosRID::idlRID *getRIDp();
protected:
friend class RolesGraph;
List *_juniorList; 
long childCountU const;
CORBA::Boolean addJunior(Role* node);
CORBA::Boolean removeJunior(Role* node);
CORBA::Boolean addPriv(const CORBA::Strings privID);
CORBA::Boolean isPrivJunior(CosRID::idlRID *rid);
} ;
class RolesGraph : public CosRoles_impl::idlRolesGraph_impl 
{
public:
RolesGraph(); I I  Default constructor: build an empty
role graph
RolesGraph(Role *root); // build a graph with root 
-RolesGraph();
RolesGraphS operator=(RolesGraphS rg);
Role* Root() const; // return pointer to the root if authorized
Role* Node (RID rid); I I  return pointer to the node with the rid
CORBA::Boolean isJunior(CosRID::idlRID *ridl, CosRID::idlRID 
*rid2) const;
// return TRUE if role with ridl is a junior 
// role of the role with rid2
CORBA::Boolean isCycle(List *seniorList, Role* role);
I I  return TRUE if cycle exists after adding role 
I I  return FALSE otherwise
RolesGraph* removeRedundantPaths(); // Optional optimization routine 
CosRoles::idlRolesGraph* remove(CosRID::idlRID* rid);
RolesGraph* add(List *seniorList, Role* role);
RolesGraph* update(List *seniorList, Role* new_role,
CosRID::idlRID* rid);
CORBA::Boolean addUser(CORBA::Strings login, CORBA::Strings ip,
RID *rid);
CORBA::Boolean delUser(CORBA::Strings login, CORBA::Strings ip); 
CORBA::Boolean checkSecurity(CORBA::Strings login, CORBA::Strings
ip.
CORBA::Strings privID);
private:
displayGraph();
Role* _node_ptr[MAXTABLE+1];
Role* _root;
CORBA::Boolean isCycle(Role* role); // Check if this role is in a 
cycle.
CosRoles::seqUserlnfo _userinfo;
} ;
#endif
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#include <stdlib.h>
♦include <string.h>
♦include "CosRoles_s.hh"
♦include "RID.h"
♦include "Roles.h"
♦include "misc.h"
CORBA::Boolean List::is_empty()
{
return list == 0 ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
CORBA::Boolean List::append(Role *val) 
{
Item *pt = new Item(val);
Item *iter_list = list; 
if (list == 0) {
list = new Itern(val); 
list->next = 0; 
at_end = list;
}
else {
while (iter_list) {
if (iter_list->val == val) 
return FALSE;
iter_list = iter_list->next;
}
at_end->next = pt; 
at_end = pt;
}
_length++; 
return TRUE;
void List::display()
{
for (Item *pt = list; pt; pt = pt->next)
cout << * (pt->val->getRIDp()->get_RIDstring()) << " ";
cout << endl;
}
Role *List::remove_first()
{
Role *tmprole;
if (list == 0) 
return 0;
else {
tmprole = list->val; 
list = list->next;
_length--;
)
return tmprole;
void List::remove()
{
Item *pt = list; 
while (pt) {
Item *tmp = pt; 
pt = pt->next;
)
list = at_end = current = 0; 
_length = 0;
CORBA::Boolean List::is_present(Role *item) { 
if (list == 0) 
return FALSE; 
if (list->val == item || at_end->val == item) 
return TRUE;
Item *pt = list->next; 
for (; pt != at_end; pt = pt->next) 
if (pt->val == item) 
return TRUE; 
return FALSE;
CORBA::Boolean List::remove(Role *val)
{
Item *pt = list;
Role *del_role;
if (pt && pt->val == val) {
Item *tmp = pt->next; 
del_role = pt->val; 
list = tmp;
_length--; // _length should be zero after 
return TRUE;
)
if (_length == 0) {
return FALSE;
)
Item *prev = pt;
pt = pt->next;
while (pt) {
if (pt->val == val) { 
prev->next = pt->next; 
if (at_end == pt) 
at_end = prev; 
del_role = pt->val; 
pt = prev->next;
_length--; 
return TRUE;
}
else {
prev = p t ; 
pt = pt->next;
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}
}
return FALSE;
}
Role *List::iterator()
{
Role* tmprole;
if (is_empty()) {
cout << "In iterator: list is empty, 
return 0;
}
else if (!current) { 
return 0;
}
else if (current == at_end || at_end = 
tmprole = current->val; 
current = 0; 
return tmprole;
}
tmprole = current->val;
current = current->next;
return tmprole;
void List::reset_current()
{
if (!is_empty()) 
current = list;
}
List& List::operator=(List &1)
{
Item *tmpitem;
Item *listiterator;
listiterator = l.list; 
remove();
while(tmpitem = listiterator) { 
append(tmpitem->val); 
listiterator = listiterator->next;
}
return *this;
long List::length() 
{
return _length;
}
Role::-Role()
{
CORBA::ULong i;
<< endl;
list) {
<6?
for (i = 0; i < _accessList.length(); i++)
_privset.remove(i) ; 
for (i = 0; i < _accessList.length(); i++)
_accessList.remove(i) ; 
for (i = 0; i < _denialList.length(); i++)
_denialList.remove(i);
}
RoleS Role::operator=(Role Srole)
{
_rid = role._rid;
_privset = role._privset;
_union_privset = role._union_privset;
_accessList = role._accessList;
_denialList = role,_denialList;
return *this;
}
CosRoles::seqld *Role::getPrivset()
{
return S_privset;
}
CosRoles::seqAuth *Role::getAccessList()
{
return S_accessList;
)
CosRoles::seqAuth *Role::getDenialList()
{
return S_denialList;
}
CosRID::idlRID *Role::getRIDp()
{
return _rid;
}
CORBA::Boolean Role::inPrivatePrivset(const CORBA::Strings privID) 
{
for (int i = 0; i < _privset.length(); i++) 
if (privID == _privset[i]) 
return TRUE; 
return FALSE;
}
CORBA::Boolean Role::inUnionPrivset(const CORBA::String& login,
const CORBA::Strings ip, 
const CORBA::Strings privID)
{
long toprid;
Role *cur_role, *junior_role;
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List *queue = new List;
CosRoles::auth_para auth_parameters;
STATUS visited[MAXTABLE];
if(canAccess(login, ip)) {
if (inPrivatePrivset(privID) ) {
return TRUE;
)
}
else {
cout << login << " at " << ip << " can not access this role." << 
endl ;
return FALSE;
}
cout << "pass current role test" << endl; 
toprid = getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
cout << "rid is " << toprid << endl; 
for (int i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) 
visited[i] = UNKNOWN; 
cur_role = this; 
visited[toprid] = ALLOWED; 
queue->append(cur_role); 
while (!queue->is_empty()) {
cur_role = queue->remove_first() ; 
cur_role->_juniorList->display(); 
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
while (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
toprid = junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
if (visited[toprid] == UNKNOWN) { 
queue->append(junior_role);
// Routine to check authority and to gather whole privilege set 
for (int i = 0; i < junior_role->getDenialList()->length() ;
i + +) {
CosRoles::seqAuth *denial_list; 
denial_list = junior_role->getDenialList(); 
auth_parameters = (*denial_list)[i]; 
if ((auth_parameters.login() == login) &&
(auth_parameters.ip() == ip)) (
visited[toprid] = DENIALED;
}
}
if (visited[toprid] == UNKNOWN) {
for (int i = 0; i < junior_role->getAccessList()->length(); i++)
{
CosRoles::seqAuth *access_list; 
access_list = junior_role->getAccessList(); 
auth_parameters = (*access_list)[i]; 
if ((auth_parameters.login() == login) &&
(auth_parameters.ip() == ip)) {
visited[toprid] = ALLOWED;
if (junior_role->inPrivatePrivset(privID) == TRUE) 
return TRUE;
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}
}
}
if (visited[toprid] == UNKNOWN) {
if (junior_role->inPrivatePrivset(privID) == TRUE) { 
cout << "inherit access allowed" << endl; 
return TRUE;
}
}
}
}
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
}
delete [] visited; 
return FALSE;
}
CORBA::Boolean Role::canAccess(const CORBA::Strings login,
const CORBA::Strings ip)
{
Role *junior_role;
CosRoles::auth_para auth_parameters; 
int i ;
junior_role = this;
for (i = 0; i < junior_role->getDenialList()->length() ; i++) {
CosRoles::segAuth *denial_list; 
denial_list = junior_role->getDenialList(); 
auth_parameters = (*denial_list) [i] ; 
if ((auth_parameters.login() == login) SS 
(auth_parameters.ip() == ip)) {
return FALSE;
}
)
for (i =0; i < junior_role->getAccessList()->length(); i++) {
CosRoles::seqAuth *access_list; 
access_list = junior_role->getAccessList(); 
auth_parameters = (*access_list)[i]; 
if ((auth_parameters.login() == login) SS 
(auth_parameters.ip() == ip)) { 
return TRUE;
}
)
return FALSE;
CORBA::Boolean Role::isPrivJunior(CosRID::idlRID *rid)
{
Role *junior_role, *cur_role; 
cur_role = this;
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
while (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
if (rid->get_RIDlong() == junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()) {
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cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current(); 
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
long Role::childCount() const 
{
return _juniorList->length();
}
CORBA::Boolean Role::addJunior(Role* node)
{
return (_juniorList->append(node) ) ;
)
CORBA::Boolean Role::removeJunior(Role* node)
{
return (_juniorList->remove(node));
}
CORBA::Boolean Role::addPriv(const CORBA::String& privID) 
{
if (!inPrivatePrivset(privID)) {
_privset.append(privID); 
return TRUE;
}
else
return FALSE;
)
RolesGraph::RolesGraph()
{
_root = 0;
for (int i=0; i < MAXTABLE; i++)
_node_ptr[i] = 0;
}
RolesGraph::RolesGraph(Role *root)
{
long toprid;
Role *cur_role, *junior_role;
CORBA::Boolean visited[MAXTABLE];
List ‘queue = new List; 
int i ;
for (i=0; i < MAXTABLE; i++)
_node_ptr[i] = 0;
_root = root;
toprid = root->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
node ptrftoprid] = root;
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for (i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) 
visited[i] = FALSE; 
cur_role = root; 
visited[toprid] = TRUE; 
queue->append(cur_role); 
while {!queue->is_empty()) {
cur_role = queue->remove_first(); 
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
while (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
toprid = junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
if (visited[toprid] == FALSE) { 
queue->append(junior_role); 
visited[toprid] = TRUE;
_node_ptr[toprid] = junior_role;
}
}
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
}
delete [] visited;
}
RolesGraph::-RolesGraph()
{
delete _root; 
delete [] _node_ptr;
}
RolesGraphk RolesGraph::operator=(RolesGraph &rg)
{
int i ;
for (i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++)
_node_ptr[i] = rg._node_ptr[i];
_root = rg._root;
return *this;
}
Role *RolesGraph::Root() const 
{
return _root;
}
Role *RolesGraph::Node(RID rid)
{
if (_node_ptr[rid.get_RIDlong()]) {
return node otrfrid.qet RIDlong()];
}
else
return 0;
}
CORBA::Boolean RolesGraph::isJunior(CosRID::idlRID *junior_rid,
CosRID::idlRID *senior_rid) const
{
long toprid;
Role *cur_role, *junior_role;
List ‘queue = new List;
CORBA::Boolean visited[MAXTABLE];
toprid = senior_rid->get_RIDlong();
if (_node_ptr[toprid] ==0) // Junior role doesn't exist 
return FALSE;
for (int i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) 
visitedfi] = FALSE; 
cur_role = _node_ptr[toprid]; 
visited[toprid] = TRUE; 
queue->append(cur_role); 
while (!gueue->is_empty()) {
cur_role = queue->remove_first(); 
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
while (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
toprid = junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
if (visited[toprid] == FALSE) { 
queue->append(junicr_role); 
visited[toprid] = TRUE;
if (junior_rid->get_RIDlong() == toprid) { 
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current(); 
delete [] visited; 
return TRUE;
}
}
}
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
}
delete [] visited; 
return FALSE;
// Perform BFS starting from role to look for cycle.
CORBA::Boolean RolesGraph::isCycle(Role *role)
{
long thisrid, toprid;
Role *cur_role, *junior_role;
CORBA::Boolean visited[MAXTABLE];
List ‘queue = new List;
thisrid = role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
for (int i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) 
visited[i] = FALSE;
cur_role = role;
visited[thisrid] = FALSE; I I  Allow access twice 
queue->append(cur_role) ; 
while (!queue->is_empty()) {
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cur_role = queue->remove_first();
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current(); // double insured 
while (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
toprid = junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
if (visited[toprid] == FALSE) { 
queue->append(junior_role); 
visited[toprid] = TRUE; 
if (toprid == thisrid) 
return TRUE;
}
}
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
}
delete [] visited;
return FALSE;
}
// Perform BFS on every roles with the graph to check if there exists 
cycle.
CORBA: .-Boolean RolesGraph:: isCycle (List *seniorList, Role *role)
{
List *added_seniorlist = new List;
Role *cur_role;
CORBA::Boolean visited[MAXTABLE];
CORBA::Boolean role_added[MAXTABLE];
CORBA::Boolean ret;
int i ;
for (i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) {
visited[i] = FALSE; 
role_added[i] = FALSE;
}
seniorList->reset_current();
while (cur_role = seniorList->iterator()) {
if (added_seniorlist->append(cur_role) == FALSE) { 
added_seniorlist->remove(cur_role);
}
if (cur_role->addJunior(role) == TRUE) {
role_added[cur_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()] = TRUE;
}
}
ret = FALSE;
for (i = 0; i <= MAXTABLE; i++) {
if (cur_role = _node_ptr[i]) {
cout << "isCycle testing " << *(cur_role->getRIDp()- 
>get_RnameString())
<< " with RID " << i << endl; 
if (isCycle(cur_role)) {
cout << " forms cycle" << endl; 
ret = TRUE; 
break;
}
else
cout << " doesn't form cycle" << endl;
}
}
added_seniorlist->reset_current();
while (cur_role = added_seniorlist->iterator() ) {
if (role_added[cur_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()] == TRUE) 
cur_role->removeJunior(role);
)
delete [] visited; 
delete [] role_added; 
delete added_seniorlist; 
return ret;
CosRoles::idlRolesGraph* RolesGraph::remove(CosRID::idlRID* rid)
{
long thisrid, toprid;
Role *cur_role, *junior_role, *del_role, *add_role;
CORBA::Boolean visited[MAXTABLE];
List *gueue = new List;
CORBA::Boolean done;
del_role = _node_ptr[rid->get_RIDlong()]; 
thisrid = _root->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
for (int i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) 
visited[i] = FALSE; 
cur_role = _root; 
visited[thisrid] = TRUE; 
queue->append(cur_role); 
done = FALSE;
while (!queue->is_empty()) {
cur_role = queue->remove_first(); 
if (cur_role->isPrivJunior(rid)) {
cout << *(rid->get_RnameString()) << " is a private junior of " 
<< * (cur_role->getRIDp()->get_RnameString()) << endl; 
cur_role->_juniorList->display(); 
if (cur_role->removeJunior(del_role)) {
del_role->_juniorList->reset_current(); 
while (add_role = del_role->_juniorList->iterator()) 
cur_role->addJunior (add_role) ; 
delete del_role;
}
cur_role->_juniorList->display(); 
done = TRUE;
}
else
done = FALSE; 
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
while (!done && (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator())) 
toprid = junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
if (visited[toprid] == FALSE) { 
queue->append(junior_role); 
visited[toprid] = TRUE; 
if (junior_role->isPrivJunior(rid)) {
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if (junior_role->removeJunior(del_role)) {
del_role->_juniorList->reset_current(); 
while (add_role = del_role->_juniorList->iterator()) 
junior_role->addJunior(add_role); 
delete del_role;
}
else {
cout << "Error: removing junior role" << endl; 
return 0;
}
}
}
}
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
}
_node_ptr[rid->get_RIDlong()] = 0; 
delete [] visited; 
return this;
}
// Add new role to role graph.
// Remove redundant paths.
RolesGraph* RolesGraph::add(List *seniorList, Role* role)
{
Role *senior_role, *add_role, *junior_role;
CosRID::idlRID *add_rid;
if (isCycle(seniorList, role)) 
return 0;
cout << "passed cycle test" << endl;
if (_node_ptr[role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()]) { // Should not happen
cout << "Error: RID already exists" << endl; 
return 0;
)
else
_node_ptr[role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()] = role; 
role->_juniorList->reset_current();
while (junior_role = role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
if (_node_ptr[junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()] == 0)
_node_ptr[junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()] = junior_role; 
else if (_node_ptr[junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong()] !=
junior_role) (
cout << "Inconsistent node ptrs!" << endl; 
exit(0);
}
}
seniorList->reset_current();
while (senior_role = seniorList->iterator()) {
role->_juniorList->reset_current();
I I Remove immediate redundant paths 
while (add_role = role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
if (senior_role->isPrivJunior(add_role->getRIDp())) 
senior_role->_juniorList->remove(add_role);
)
senior_role->addJunior(role);
}
return this;
}
RolesGraph* RolesGraph::update(List *seniorList, Role* new_role, 
CosRID::idlRID* oldrid)
{
if (oldrid->get_RIDlong() != new_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong())
cout << "Warning: RIDs are different!" << endl;
RolesGraph::remove(oldrid);
RolesGraph::add(seniorList, new_role); 
return this;
// Display the whole role graph
RolesGraph::displayGraph()
{
long thisrid;
Role *cur_role, *junior_role;
CORBA::Boolean visited[MAXTABLE];
List *queue = new List;
thisrid = _root->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
cout << "In displayGraph: root is " << thisrid << endl; 
for (int i = 0; i < MAXTABLE; i++) 
visited[i] = FALSE; 
cur_role = _root;
visited[thisrid] = TRUE; // Allow access twice
queue->append(cur_role);
cout << "Roles Graph:" << endl;
while (!queue->is_empty()) {
cur_role = queue->remove_first();
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current(); // double insured 
cout << *(cur_role->getRIDp()->get_RnameString()) <<
<< endl;
while (junior_role = cur_role->_juniorList->iterator()) {
thisrid = junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RIDlong(); 
cout << " "
<< *(junior_role->getRIDp()->get_RnameString()) << endl; 
if (visited[thisrid] == FALSE) { 
queue->append(junior_role); 
visited[thisrid] = TRUE;
}
}
cur_role->_juniorList->reset_current();
}
delete [] visited; 
return FALSE;
CORBA::Boolean RolesGraph::addUser(CORBA::Strings login,
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CORBA::String& ip,
RID *rid)
int i ;
CosRoles::user_info userinfo;
for (i = 0; i < _userinfo.length(); i++) { 
if ((_userinfo[i].login() == login) SS 
(_userinfo[i].ip() == ip)) {
cout << "Username " << login << " exists." << endl; 
return FALSE;
)
}
userinfo.login() = login; 
userinfo.ip() = ip;
userinfo.rid_long() = rid->get_RIDlong();
_userinfo.append(userinfo) ; 
return TRUE;
)
CORBA::Boolean RolesGraph::delUser(CORBA::Strings login,
CORBA::Strings ip)
{
int i ;
for (i = 0; i < _userinfo.length(); i++)
if (_userinfo[i].login() == login SS _userinfo[i].ip() == ip) ( 
_userinfo.remove(i); 
return TRUE;
)
return FALSE;
}
CORBA::Boolean RolesGraph::checkSecurity(CORBA::Strings login,
CORBA::Strings ip,
CORBA::Strings privID)
{
int i ; 
long rid=0;
Role *user_role;
cout << "In checkSecurity : " << endl; 
for (i = 0; i < _userinfo.length(); i++) {
if ((_userinfo[i].login() == login) SS 
(_userinfo[i].ip() == ip)) { 
cout << "Username " << login << " exists and belongs to role
" << endl;
rid = _userinfo[i).rid_long();
// cout << * (_node_ptr[rid]->getRIDp()-
>get_RnameString()) << endl; 
break;
}
}
cout << "here 2 "  «  endl;
if (!rid) {
cout << "Can't find security information of user " << login 
<< endl; 
return FALSE;
}
else
cout << "rid is " << rid << endl; 
user_role = _node_ptr[rid] ; 
if (!user_role->canAccess(login, ip)) 
return FALSE;
if (user_role->inUnionPrivset(login, ip, privID)) (
cout << "User " << login << " pass security clearance for " 
<< privID << endl; 
return TRUE;
}
cout << "after check inUnionPrivset" << endl; 
return FALSE;
APPENDIX V
SECURITY MONITOR PROGRAM
ttifndef _monitor_h 
ttdefine _monitor_h
// Monitor server program. Caches compute servers
#include "comp_c.hh"// ComputeServer client 
#include "CosRoles_s.hh"
#include "RXD.h"
class SecurityEventHandler: public CORBA::BOA::IMPLEventHandler 
{
protected:
void pre_method (const CORBA::Principals princ,
const char ‘interface, const CORBA::Objects obj, 
CORBA::ULong methodid, CORBA::Environments env);
} ;
class MonitorServer: public CosRoles..impl::Monitor_impl 
{
friend SecurityEventHandler; 
private:
CosRoles::ServerList_servers;
CORBA::ULong_cur_index;
CosRoles::AccessControlList_userList; I I  temporary move from pri­
vate
protected:
void unbind(const CORBA::Principals princ, const char ‘interface, 
const CORBA::Objects obj);
public:
MonitorServer(const char ‘name) : Monitor_impl(name) {
_cur_index = 0;}
-MonitorServer() {}
void add_user(const char ‘name);
void register_server(ComputeServer ‘server);
ComputeServer *get_server(CORBA::Environments env);
) ;
#endif
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#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include ./persist_store/CosPersPID_s.hh" 
#include ./persist_store/posPID.h" 
#include "../persist_store/CosPersPDS_s.hh" 
#include ./persist_store/posPDS.h" 
#include "CosRID_s.hh"
#include "CosRoles_s.hh"
#include "RID.h"
#include "Roles.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "monsrv.h"
extern RolesGraph *rolesgraph; 
void create_rolesgraph(void); 
RolesGraph *get_rolesgraph(void);
void SecurityEventHandler::pre_method(const CORBA::Principals princ,
const char *interface, const
CORBA::Objects obj,
CORBA::ULong methodid,
CORBA:Environments env)
{
CORBA::String name;
CORBA::String hostname;
RolesGraph *persistent_rolesgraph;
CORBA::String priv("Access to project files");
name = princ.userName(); 
hostname = princ.hostName(); 
cout << "Checking validity for user " << princ.userName() << " 
at host "
<< princ.hostName() << endl; 
persistent_rolesgraph = get_rolesgraph();
if (persistent_rolesgraph->checkSecurity(name, hostname, priv)) 
cout << "Security test passed!" << endl;
else
env.exception_value(new CORBA::StExcep::NO_PERMISSION);
}
void MonitorServer::unbind(const CORBA::Principals princ, const char *, 
const CORBA::Objects )
{
CORBA::ULong num_servers = _servers.length(); 
for (CORBA::ULong i = num_servers; i > 0; i--) {
ServerAssocS server = _servers[i — 1]; 
if ( server.host_name() == princ.hostName() SS 
server.pid() == princ.pid() )
.servers.remove(i-1);
}
}
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void MonitorServer::add_user(const char *name)
{
_userList.append(new CORBA::String(name));
}
void MonitorServer::register_server(ComputeServer ‘server)
{
// Get client info
const CORBA::Principal *princ = _principal();
ServerAssoc ‘assoc = new ServerAssoc; 
assoc->host_name() = princ->hostName(); 
assoc->pid() = princ->pid(); 
assoc->server(server);
cout << "host name is " << princ->hostName() << ", pid is " << 
princ->pid()
<< ", loginName is " << princ->loginName() << ", password is
\ \
<< princ->password() << endl;
// NOTE: We do not need to _duplicate the server
// (Increment the ref count) since append on sequences automati­
cally
// increment the ref count. The ref count is decrmented when 
// the element is removed/ sequence is deleted.
_servers.append(assoc);
}
// Uses Round Robin scheduling to give out ComputeServer Objects 
ComputeServer *MonitorServer::get_server(CORBA::Environments env)
{
//if ( ! valid_user(_principal()) ) {
// env.exception_value(new PermissionDenied);
// return NULL;
/ / }
if ( _servers.length() == 0) {
env.exception_value(new NoServers); 
return NULL;
}
if ( _cur_index >= _servers.length() )
_cur_index = 0;
ComputeServer ‘server = _servers[_cur_index++].server(); 
server->_duplicate();// Return value is released by ORB 
return server;
)
void sighandler(int)
{
exit(0);
)
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int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
signal (SIGINT, sighandler) ;
MonitorServer server("TestMonitor");
CORBA::BOA *boa = CORBA::BOA::instance();
// Create Role graph
create_rolesgraph();
// Attach the event handler to implementation so that unbind 
// gets called when clients disconnect
CORBA::Environment env;
boa->event_handler(&server, env, new SecurityEventHandler);
if ( env.check_exception() ) {
cout << "Error registering event handler." << endl; 
cout << env;
}
CORBA::BOA::impl_is_ready(); 
return 0;
}
APPENDIX VI
ROLE GRAPH INITIALIZATION PROGRAM
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include ./persist_store/CosPersPID_s.hh"
#include "../persist_store/posPID.h"
#include ./persist_store/CosPersPDS_s.hh"
#include ./persist_store/posPDS.h"
#include "CosRID_s.hh"
#include "CosRoles_s.hh"
#include "RID.h"
#include "Roles.h"
#include "misc.h"
table_type symboltable[MAXTABLE+1];
RolesGraph *rolesgraph;
void create_rolesgraph()
{
RID *ridO = new RID("Root", "flash.adb.com");
RID *ridl = new RID("Project Manager", "flash.adb.com") 
RID *rid2 = new RID("Office Manager", "flash.adb.com"); 
RID *rid3 = new RID("Reception", "flash.adb.com");
RID *rid4 = new RID("Engineer", "flash.adb.com");
RID *rid5 = new RID("Sr Engineer", "flash.adb.com");
CORBA :String *priv_a = new CORBA
CORBA :String *priv_b = new CORBA
CORBA
files
:String 
') ;
*priv_c = new CORBA
CORBA :String *priv_d = new CORBA:
CORBA::String 
account");
*priv_e new CORBA:
CORBA :String *priv_f = new CORBA
CORBA :String *priv_g = new CORBA
CORBA :String *priv_h = new CORBA
CORBA :String *priv_i = new CORBA
CORBA :String *loginO = new CORBA:
CORBA :String *loginl = new CORBA:
:String("Access to reception desk"); 
:String("Personal files");
:String("Check out development
:String("Incoming phone calls");
:String("Create new computer
:String("Issue checks");
:String("Access to project files");
:String("Cancel projects");
:String("Order office supplies");
:String("john");
:String("eugene");
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CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA: 
CORBA:
String
String
String
String
String
String
String
String
String
*login2 
*login3 
*login4 
*login5 
*login6 
*login7 
*login8 
*login9 
*ipO =
new
new
new
new
new
new
new
new
CORBA
CORBA
CORBA
CORBA
CORBA
CORBA
CORBA
CORBA
:String("sharon");
:String("michael"); 
:String("michelle") 
:String("william"); 
:String("tom");
:String("cheryl");
:String("jean");
:String("dave");
new CORBA::String("flash.adb.com")
CosRoles::seqld privsetO, privsetl, privset2, privset3, privset4, 
privset5;
CosRoles::seqAuth al_reception, al_off_man, al_engineer, al_sr_engineer, 
al_proj_man, al_root;
CosRoles::seqAuth dl_reception, dl_off_man, dl_engineer, dl_sr_engineer, 
dl_proj_man, dl_root;
CosRoles::auth_para auth_parameterO, auth_parameterl, auth_parameter2, 
auth_parameter3, auth_parameter4, auth_parameter5, auth_parameter6, 
auth_parameter7, auth_parameter8, auth_parameter9;
CORBA::String *priv_j = new CORBA::String("Audit accounts");
CosRoles::seqld privset_fc;
CosRoles::seqAuth al_fc, dl_fc;
CosRoles::auth_para auth_parameterlO;
CORBA::String *loginlO = new CORBA::String("tim");
for (int i = 0; i < MAXTABLE+1; i++)
*(symboltable[i].name) = '\0';
privsetO.append(*priv_a) 
privsetO.append!*priv_d) 
privsetl.append(*priv_c) 
privsetl.append(*priv_g) 
privset2.append(*priv_b) 
privset2.append(*priv_i) 
privset2.append(*priv_f) 
privset3.append(*priv_g) 
privset4.append(*priv_h) 
privset5.append(*priv_e)
auth_parameterO.login(*login0); 
auth_parameterO.ip(*ipO);
auth_parameterl.login(*loginl); 
auth_parameterl.ip(*ip0);
auth_parameter2.login(*login2); 
auth_parameter2.ip(*ip0);
auth_parameter3.login(*login3); 
auth_parameter3.ip(* ipO);
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auth_parameter4.login(*login4); 
auth_parameter4.ip(*ip0);
auth_parameter5.login(*login5); 
auth_parameter5.ip(*ipO);
auth_parameter6.login(*login6); 
auth_parameter6.ip(*ip0);
auth_parameter7.login(*login7); 
auth_parameter7.ip(*ip0);
auth_parameter8.login(*login8); 
auth_parameter8.ip(* ipO);
auth_parameter9.login(*login9); 
auth_parameter9.ip(* ipO);
al_reception.append(auth_parameter2); 
al_reception.append(auth_parameter7); 
dl_reception.append(auth_parameter3); 
dl_reception.append(auth_parameter5); 
al_engineer.append(auth_parameter3); 
al_engineer.append(auth_parameter6); 
al_engineer.append(auth_parameter4); 
dl_engineer.append(auth_parameter2); 
dl_engineer.append(auth_parameter7); 
dl_engineer.append(auth_parameter5); 
al_off_man.append(auth_parameter8); 
dl_off_man.append(auth_parameter2) ; 
dl_off_man.append(auth_parameter7); 
dl_off_man.append(auth_parameter3); 
dl_o f f_man.append(auth_parameter6); 
al_sr_engineer.append(auth_parameterO); 
dl_sr_engineer.append(auth_parameter 8); 
dl_sr_engineer.append(auth_parameter3); 
al proi man.append(auth_parameter9); 
dl_proj_man.append(auth_parameterO); 
dl_proj_man.append(auth_parameter8); 
al_root.append(auth_parameterl); 
dl_root.append(auth_parameter9);
List *jl_reception = new List;
List *jl_off_man = new List;
List *jl_proj_man = new List;
List *jl_sr_engineer = new List;
List *jl_engineer = new List;
List *jl_root = new List;
Role *role_reception = new Role(rid3, privsetO, al_reception,
dl_reception, jl_reception);
Role *role_engineer = new Role(rid4, privsetl, al_reception,
dl_reception, jl_engineer);
106
jl_off_man->append(role_reception);
Role *role_off_man = new Role(rid2, privset2, al_off_man,
dl_off_man, jl_off_man); 
jl_sr_engineer->append(role_engineer); 
jl_sr_engineer->append(role_reception);
Role *role_sr_engineer = new Role(rid5, privset3, al_sr_engineer,
dl_sr_engineer, jl_sr_engineer);
Role *role__proj_man = new Role(ridl, privset4, al_proj_man,
dl_proj_man, jl_proj_man);
Role *role_root = new Role(rid0, privset5, al_root, 
dl_root, jl_root);
rolesgraph = new RolesGraph(role_root); 
List *s1 = new List; 
sl->append(role_root); 
rolesgraph->add(si, role_proj_man);
List *sl2 = new List; 
sl2->append(role_proj_man); 
rolesgraph->add(sl2, role_sr_engineer); 
rolesgraph->add(sl2, role_off_man);
Role *role;
role = rolesgraph->Root();
cout << "Root role is " << *(role->getRIDp()->get_RnameString()) << 
endl ;
RID rid6("Financial Controller", "flash.adb.com");
privset_fc.append(*priv_j);
auth_parameterlO.login(*loginlO);
auth_parameterlO.ip(*ipO);
al_fc.append(auth_parameterlO) ;
dl_fc.append(auth_parameter2);
dl_fc.append(auth_parameter9) ;
List *jl_fc = new List; 
jl_fc->append(role_engineer) ; 
jl_fc->append(role_off_man);
Role *role_fc = new Role(&rid6, privset_fc, al_fc, dl_fc, jl_fc); 
List *sl_fc = new List; 
sl_fc->append(role_root);
rolesgraph->addUser(*login2, 
rolesgraph->addUser(*login3, 
rolesgraph->addUser(*login4, *ipO, rid4) 
rolesgraph->addUser(*login6, 
rolesgraph->addUser(*login7, *ipO, rid3) 
rolesgraph->addUser(*login8, 
rolesgraph->addUser(*login9, *ipO, ridl)
// Creating persistent rolesgraph
ipO, rid5)
ipO, ridO)
ipO, rid3)
ipO, rid4)
O, 4)
ipO, rid4)
3)
ipO, rid2)
RolesGraph *newobj;
newobj = rolesgraph;
PosPID newpid("EOS.2.0.2", "Rolegraph", "flash.adb.com");
CORBA::String *newstring;
newstring = newpid.get_PIDString() ; 
cout << *newstring << endl;
PosPDS *newpds = new PosPDS((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, knewpid) 
// Remove persistent role graph
newpds->connect((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, Snewpid); 
newpds->remove((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, knewpid); 
newpds->disconnect((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, &newpid);
newpds->setobj size((long) sizeof(RolesGraph));
// Store persistent role graph
newpds->connect((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, &newpid); 
newpds->store((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, &newpid); 
newpds->disconnect((CosPersPDS::Object *) newobj, &newpid);
RolesGraph *get_rolesgraph(void)
{
/ *
cout << "Start testing isCycle......" «  endl;
if (rolesgraph->isCycle(sl_fc, role_fc))
cout << "Cycle exists after adding role, "
<< *(role_fc->getRIDp()->get_RnameString()) << endl;
else
cout << "Cycle doesn't exist after adding role, "
<< *(role_fc->getRIDp()->get_RnameString()) << endl;
if (rolesgraph->isJunior(rid4, ridl))
cout << *(rid4.get_RnameString()) << " is a junior of " <<
*(ridl.get_RnameString()) << endl;
else
cout << *(rid4.get_RnameString()) << " is not a junior of " <<
*(ridl.get_RnameString()) << endl;
* /
// rolesgraph->displayGraph();
PosPID newpid("EOS.2.0.2", "Rolegraph", "flash.adb.com");
CORBA::String *newstring;
RolesGraph *getobj = new RolesGraph;
newstring = newpid.get_PIDString() ; 
cout << *newstring << endl;
PosPDS *newpds = new PosPDS((CosPersPDS::Object *) getobj, &newpid) 
newpds->connect((CosPersPDS::Object *) getobj, &newpid);
f ((getobj = (RolesGraph *) newpds->restore((CosPersPDS::Object *
getobj,
&newpid)) != NULL) {
cout << "After restore" << endl;
cout << "Object ptr after restoring is " << getobj << endl; 
getobj->displayGraph();
} else
cout << "return null from restore" << endl; 
cout << "Before disconnect" << endl;
newpds->disconnect((CosPersPDS::Object *) getobj, knewpid); 
cout << "After disconnect" << endl;
return getobj;
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